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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The project examines the continuities and divergences in aesthetic philosophy from 
Pali Buddhist and Sanskrit literature to that of medieval Sri Lanka.  Special attention is 
given to the association of moral authority with the capacity for literary and artistic 
production, and the means by which persons are so entitled.  The project concludes 
with reflections on the political significance in medieval Sri Lanka of the contiguity of 
these themes, as well as that of the conflation the personage of king with the Buddha. 
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Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction      
Both the European and South Asian intellectual traditions have historically 
viewed the appreciation and creation of art (or at least a certain species of “high art”) 
as the provenance of the upper echelons of society.  In the Indian context, the 
perceived basis for the appreciation of art and literature grew out of sophisticated 
theories concerning the foundations of aesthetic experience, with the tradition tending 
to regard elite members of society as possessing a disproportionately greater capacity 
for aesthetic appreciation and artistic literary production.  Those of noble station 
were at the same time seen as morally entitled in their roles as adjudicators, 
governors, and more generally in possessing a freedom from the standards of 
propriety incumbent upon their social subordinates.   
One might be surprised to find these tendencies represented in the literature 
of Buddhist Sri Lanka, being part of a tradition associated by many with 
egalitarianism, and at the same time dissociated from the sensuous and emotionally 
evocative.  The following is an examination of the aesthetics and ethics of Sri Lankan 
Buddhist literature from approximately the 12
th to 15
th centuries CE.  Considered are 
the continuities from the continental Indian literary world: presuppositions regarding 
the aptitude for aesthetic appreciation of the audiences of these works, their 
discernable (though by no means necessarily explicit) ethically educative function, as 
well as the distribution of moral authority within the society in which they were 
written, and the intersections of these themes.  
I include cross references with the canonical Pāli Buddhist scriptures 
(presumed to have taken their inherited form at least 1000 years prior to the period 
under review), considering possible historical reasons for variations from late 
medieval Sinhala literature.  Comparison between Buddhist literature of the two eras 
furnishes a comparative framework yielding a number of emergent questions.  While  
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the audience of the Pāli scriptures (and pre medieval Sri Lankan Buddhist works for 
that matter) was essentially exclusively monastic, medieval Sri Lankan authors made 
an unprecedented attempt to reach lay audiences, resulting in the emergence of a new 
literary genre: the ba apota or “preaching text.”   
While ostensibly recapitulations of stories of the Buddha in his former lives, 
these texts offer a glimpse into the social stratigraphy of the world in which they were 
composed, permitting speculation regarding authorial intention and the ways in which 
texts may have configured as political instruments.  Among the questions to be 
considered:  Do these texts affirm or attempt to forge class hierarchies?  How were 
mythological elements of the Pāli scriptures (such as the cakravartin or “Universal 
Monarch”) transposed onto the real world political affairs in medieval Sri Lanka?  Do 
ostensibly soteriological exhortations and themes have political significance in context 
of composition and reception?  
Modern social scientists have suggested that the way we respond emotionally 
to given situations or stimuli is the product of social conditioning, as opposed to being 
more or less uniformly determined.  I will explore recent efforts (influenced by this 
trend) to read Sinhala Buddhist texts as having been authored with the intention of 
emotionally conditioning their audiences in mind, considering the validity of this 
paradigm for the two genres of Buddhist scriptures detailed above.  If in fact a select 
group of individuals were seen as better disposed or more entitled to emotionally 
condition others, while perhaps being a departure from the medieval Indian 
presuppositions that emotional response patterns are innate and intractable, this 
would be a confirmation of the perceived efficacy of texts to morally educate, to 
establish political allegiance, or to do both at once.  It is around the nexus of aesthetic 
production, elicitation of emotions and moral authority that the project will revolve.  
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Chapter 1: Theories of emotionality in Indian intellectual thought and Sri Lankan  Chapter 1: Theories of emotionality in Indian intellectual thought and Sri Lankan  Chapter 1: Theories of emotionality in Indian intellectual thought and Sri Lankan  Chapter 1: Theories of emotionality in Indian intellectual thought and Sri Lankan 
Buddhist literature Buddhist literature Buddhist literature Buddhist literature      
      
Classical Indian theories of emotionality and aesthetics Classical Indian theories of emotionality and aesthetics Classical Indian theories of emotionality and aesthetics Classical Indian theories of emotionality and aesthetics      
The notion of rasa, which literally means “taste” or “flavor,” has since at least 
as early as the common era been employed by Indian aestheticians both as an 
evaluative criterion for art, and as an explanation as to why viewers are impacted as 
they are by various modes of presentation of visual art, poetry and drama.  The 
“theory of rasa” posits eight basic emotions called sthāyi bhāvas, literally “permanent 
fixtures” or “permanent moods” – love, mirth, grief, anger, exertion, terror, disgust 
and wonder – which are supposed to reside in the soul of each person.  The sthāyi 
bhāvas are experienced as one of their eight respective moods or rasas of the erotic, 
comic, compassionate, cruel, valorous, terrible, abhorrent and miraculous.
1  Certain 
conditions determining the activation of the sthāyi bhāvas are supposed to affect each 
beholder in a uniform and predictable way, presuming that one is equipped with 
normal receptive capacity – that one is a rasika.
2  It is these determinants which the 
artist, poet or composer must be intimately familiar with and be able to render into his 
respective medium in order to be considered proficient.
3  In art, these emotions are 
evoked by (i) determinates (vibhāvas), which enable the permanent moods to be 
experienced in the first place, (ii) consequents (anubhāvas), the specific 
                                                 
1 ś  gāra, hāsya, karu a, raudra, vīra, bhayānaka, bībhatsa and adbhuta are the rasas corresponding to 
the sthāyi bhāvas (or sthāyins) of rati (love), hāsa (laughter), śoka (sorrow), krodha (anger), utsāha 
(heroism), bhaya (fear), jugupsā (disgust), and vismaya (wonder), to which later were added the rasa of 
śānta with śama (serenity) as its sthāyin. 
2 The experience of a rasa does not afford a difference of degree, and likewise a greater level of skill of 
an artist does not ensure a “more intense” experience of a rasa.  Furthermore, the experience of a rasa 
is one independent of any discursive evaluation of the art being perceived, or of any moral evaluation of 
the situation being depicted.  See my further discussion below, also see Cooper, 194. 
3 Bharata writes “the chief goal of drama is to produce rasa, the aesthetic emotion…emotion re 
presented, distilled by art.”  Quotation from the Nā yāśāstra translated by Chandra Rajan (Kalidasa 
and Chandra Rajan, 29).   Cited in Cooper, 193.  
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manifestations (physical effects) of emotion on a character, and (iii) accompanying 
mental states (vyabhicāribhāvas), those transitory and specific sentiments which 
“accompany and help to intensify the dominant emotion,”
4 such as the portrayal of 
weakness (glāni), apprehension (śa kā) and indolence (ālasya).
5   
The notion that all forms of art contain a mechanism of emotional stimulation, 
whereby basic propensities for emotional experience (sthāyi bhāvas) are activated to 
the point at which one experiences aesthetic relish was first introduced in the 
Nā yāśāstra of Bharata, dated variously between the common era and the 2
nd century 
CE.
6  The theory proposed in the Nā yāśāstra was however so thoroughly developed 
that it is widely speculated that the work may represent the consumation of a tradition 
(or a series of traditions or loosely circulating concepts) which had existed for some 
time prior.
7  Bharata theorized that a literary work is an object (or “body” – 
kāvyaśarīra) to be augmented with ornaments (ala kāras), such as similes (upamā), 
illustrations by figurative language (rūpaka), and the repetition in the same stanza of 
words or syllables similar in sound but different in meaning (yamaka).
8  Ala kāra in 
the general sense of “ornament” as well as a number of technical figures used to 
classify literary expressions were in currency prior to the writings of Pā ini (5
th century 
BCE),
9 and held a dominant place in Indian aesthetic theory for centuries following 
the Nā yāśāstra (though undergoing some transition in meaning).  It was primarily the 
                                                 
4 Wijayawardhana (1970), 82
 
5 De (1960) offers an example: “In the case of Love as a permanent mood, the stock examples given of 
a vibhāva are women and the seasons; of anubhāva, glance and embrace; of vyabhicārin, the transient 
subordinate feelings of joy and anxiety.” ((1960); vol.II, 22) 
6 Ray (2004) gives the 2
nd century BCE for the Nā yāśāstra, this given by many as at least a plausible 
terminus post quem. (see De (1960), vol. I, 18)  There is however little justification for positing such an 
early date. 
7Tilakasiri, 170 
8 De, vol. I, 26 
9 Ibid, 3  
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Ala kāra dominated aesthetic theories of such early authors as Bharata, Bhamaha 
and Da  in which influenced early Sinhala poets and critics.
10   
Later theorists of rasa began to ambiguate the function of poetry, and to 
expand the meaning of rasa to include a realm of experience beyond that of mere 
aesthetic enjoyment.  Dhvani thoery, in ascension around the 10
th century CE, posits 
“a sort of mystic essence of sound, dhvani,” thereby “eschewing the external and 
superficial aspects of poetry”
11 (i.e., the traditional notion of a kāvyaśarīra augmented 
with ala kāras).  Here, the experience of rasa has as its essence (camatkāra) a 
“dilation of the mind” – a state of wonder and absorption, transcendental (lokottara) 
in nature through the cessation of any discursive reasoning, subjectivity being replaced 
solely by the experience of rasa itself.
12  With this expansion in significance, for some 
writers the experience of rasa took on a soteriological dimension.  It was declared that, 
“Rasa is the highest plane of aesthetic enjoyment and its experience is equated to 
transcendental bliss.”
13  
When one thinks of the general orientation of early Buddhist thought, 
particularly that of the Pāli scriptures composing what has come to be known as the 
Theravāda canon, the value of extreme emotions – either of experiencing them or 
evoking them – seems far from a possible basis for religious instruction.  These texts 
uphold equanimity (uppekkha) as a religious ideal.  In the A guttara Nikāya, the 
Buddha assents to suggestion that he is “a rasa rūpa,” or, ‘one who lacks taste,’
14 
implying that he has transcended the state of being one who savors the ‘five sense 
objects.’  Indeed, in a discussion of the relevance of rasa theory to the Pāli canon, 
                                                 
10 The theories of dhvani, vyañjanā, and aucitya were not introduced until the modern, English writings 
of V. Raghavan, A. Sankaran, M. Hiriyanna, and S.K. De. (Sarachandra, 75) 
11 Tilakasiri, 172 
12 
Wijayawardhana (1970), 93
 
13 Wijayawardhana (1963), 79
 
14 Anguttara Nikāya III. 288; fr. Dhadphale, 58
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M.G. Dhadphala writes, “A religion which makes Peace or Dispassion (upasama) the 
only ultimate object of poetry can think only in terms of vimutti rasa”
15 (vimutti rasa 
here meaning the relish of the experience of emancipation from sa sāra, not of any 
worldly delight). 
We find however certain instances in the Pāli literature of the Buddha 
performing acts which do evoke strong emotions, but to these we will return after 
having discussed the role of rasa in a subsequent Buddhist literary tradition, that of 
Medieval Sinhala poetry.   
 
Direct influence of Sanskrit literature and aesthetic theory Direct influence of Sanskrit literature and aesthetic theory Direct influence of Sanskrit literature and aesthetic theory Direct influence of Sanskrit literature and aesthetic theory 
Mentioned in the Sīgiri graffiti,
16 the notion of rasa as described above as a 
component of a formal aesthetic theory was at least to some extent known in Sri 
Lanka since the production of the earliest extant Sinhala literature.
17  The influence of 
mainland Indian literary culture saw a dramatic increase following the expulsion of 
the occupying Cō a people in 1070 CE, and an influx of scholars from India and 
abroad.
18  An intense period of Sanskrit study commensed in the mid 11
th century, 
during which time Sri Lankan Buddhist monks seem to have familiarized themselves 
extensively with Sanskrit grammar, Hindu scriptures, logic, poetics and Sanskrit 
literature.
19 
The continental tradition of poetic theory and composition was adapted
20 in 
Sri Lanka to reflect the local religious and literary (and religious literary) traditions.  
                                                 
15 Dhadphale, 56
 
16 Dating from the 5th to 9th centuries CE 
17 Dhammapala, 90 
18 Ibid, 10 11
 
19 Ibid, 18 
20 I say “adapted” as opposed to “received” to avoid the assumption of unidirectional (continent to 
island) theoretical influence.  
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Attributed to King Sena IV (otherwise known as Silāmēghavar a, reinging 954 6
21), 
the Siyabas Lakara was the first and most influential Sinhala treatise on poetic theory.  
An adaptation of Da  in’s 6
th century Kāvyadarśa, the Siyabas Lakara explicitly states 
that poetry is meant to narrate the lives of the Buddha, an injunction which Sinhala 
poets appeared to have followed.
22  The hero of epic poetry (mahākāvya) was thus to 
be the Buddha in his final or previous incarnations (as Bodhisattva or “Buddha 
aspirant”).
23  The work also replaces some illustrations from Sinhala (as opposed to 
Sanskrit) works,
24 and adopts some of Da  in’s distinctions implying Indian regional 
variation in style and diction to the Sinhala/Sri Lankan context.
25  Nevertheless, much 
of classical Indian poetic theory – the notion of a kāvya śarīra (Sin: kav siruru) 
ornamented by ala kāras (Sin: lakara), sthāyi bhāvas, rasa, and the regularity of 
stimuli and their responses – were elucidated in the Siyabas Lakara, and the 
knowledge of them was well attested in the subsequent Sinhala literary tradition. 
 
Rasa and modern theories of emotion Rasa and modern theories of emotion Rasa and modern theories of emotion Rasa and modern theories of emotion      
The position that emotions are experienced in a uniform way, and that they are 
induced in a regular fashion by an enumerable set of determinates, and that this is (or 
should be) the case for every person, I propose that we deem “emotional realism.”  
                                                 
21 De Silva, 58 
22 Sarachandra, 74.  We must however bear in mind that the extant Medieval Sinhala poetry is that 
which was preserved by the Buddhist Sangha, and therefore perhaps culled from a larger pool of 
literature, some of which may have been deemed unworthy of preservation on account of its secular 
nature. 
23 See Wijayawardhana (1963), 146 
24 See ibid, 166 
25 Where the Kāvyadarśa  makes the distintion between “Vaidarbhī” and “Gau ī” styles (mārgas) of 
composition, the Siyabas Lakara distinguishes between “good” (manā maga) and “bad” (meruma 
maga),   declaring that only the “good” marga is to be followed in Sinhala poetry. (Ibid, 138; Siyabas 
Lakara I. 67)    This normative distinction is not made between Vaidarbhī and Gau ī in Kāvyadarśa, 
and reminds us that the Sinhala literary world was more geographically constricted than that of 
Sanskrit, lacking sufficient regional variations to warrant separate discussion of those styles (if they 
were in fact appreciable).  
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Representing emotional realism in the modern academic community are those who 
postulate that at least basic emotions are “feelings of physiological changes” activated 
under analogous conditions for all persons.
26  This “physicalist” perspective on 
emotions is informed by evolutionary biology, explaining their origin and function in 
terms of their communicative usefulness in social situations, and their role in 
emergency response behavior.
27  As such, the propensity for emotional responsiveness 
is seen as having a physiological basis, and as being hardwired from birth.  While 
physicalists do acknowledge that we are aware of and able to name our emotions as we 
experience them, this cognitive element of emotion is thought to be secondary to and 
dependent on the autochthonic reactions of the body.
28 
Other modern theorists, hoping to problematize the “common sense” 
understanding of emotionality as mechanical process of stimulus and response – 
“irrational rather than rational, natural rather than cultural”
29 – would find the notion 
of emotional realism unsophisticated and inadequate.  “Cognitive theories” of 
emotion suppose some sort of mental activity – thinking, believing, judging – as 
precursory to and requisite for an emotional experience.
30  For example, if a friend 
asked me what sorts of unique commodities one can purchase in Sri Lanka, and I 
should respond “a bride,” her emotional reaction may either be horripilation or 
amusement.  This reaction would itself be dependent on a judgment she made, rightly 
or wrongly, as to whether my answer was in earnest or in jest, a judgment taking into 
account the likelihood of brides actually being a commodity, her knowledge of my 
character and of a precedent of my making statements likewise absurd and facetious.  
According to cognitivists, 
                                                 
26 Lynch (1990b), 4 5 
27 See Ekman (1973a), especially Ekman (1973b) 
28 See Leavitt, 515 
29 Lynch, 5 
30 Ibid, 7 8  
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actors understand emotions as mediating social action: they arise in 
social situations and carry implications for future thought and action.  
Emotional understands, then, are not seen as abstract, symbolic 
formulations – not “thinking about feeling” so much as thoughts which 
are necessarily linked with social situations and valued goals that give 
them moral force and direction.
31 
 
Cognitive theories of emotion are therefore sensitive to the role of context in 
emotional formation.  They are in this sense commensurable with rasa theory, which 
takes into account the significance of the mood or environment (vibhāva) in which 
literary or dramaturgical events are set when determining which rasas  will be induced.  
The recognition of the role of judgment is here implicit.
32   
“Social constructionism” is a cognitive theory which posits that those cognitive 
processes preceding and determining the registering of emotion are wholly the 
products of social conditioning, and therefore that emotions themselves are not 
necessarily evoked by the same set of determinates in each individual.  Examples cited 
in support of this position are such facts as the relativity of what is humorous across 
cultures.
33  Popular among anthropologists hoping to account for “emotion’s 
constitution of social behavior,” this view holds that “general principles of social 
organization construct the size, stability, and status characteristics of the usual 
                                                 
31 Lutz and White, 419 
32 Later theorists in the tradition (including Sri Lankans) propose what might be regarded as an 
inchoate cognitive theory: While the Dhvani school maintains that secondary meanings are merely 
indicated (lak ya) or implicitly understood through the words which compose their primary meanings, 
the Siyabas Lakara claims that secondary meanings are gleaned through the process of inference 
(arthāpatti).  This is something which Dhvani theorists explicitly deny, classing instead vya gya (the 
suggested sense of words, bereft of any logical derivations) as śābda, or the valid means of knowledge. 
(Wijayawardhana (1964), 23 4)   
33 Lynch, 8 9  
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audiences for the emotional performances of individuals.”
34  For example, Appadurai 
(1985) illustrates the way in which particular expressions of gratitude are learned 
behaviors serving to affirm caste hierarchies in modern south India.
35  While not 
necessarily denying that emotions are subjectively experienced in the same way (i.e., 
that the experience of grief or amusement are in any way different between different 
people), social constructionism goes some length toward undermining emotional 
realism.
36   
 
Emotion and Gratitud Emotion and Gratitud Emotion and Gratitud Emotion and Gratitude in  e in  e in  e in medieval Sinhala medieval Sinhala medieval Sinhala medieval Sinhala Buddhis  Buddhis  Buddhis  Buddhist literature t literature t literature t literature
37 
In his doctoral dissertation entitled “Devotion in the Buddhist Literature of 
Medieval Sri Lanka,” Charles Hallisey contends that central to the concerns of 
authors of medieval Sri Lanka was a wish to inculcate in their audience a sufficient 
sense of gratitude (Skt. k tajña, Pāli. kataññu, meaning “knowing or acknowledging 
that which was done”) for the Buddha’s dispensation.  As the Buddha is acknowledged 
as having passed out of the world, the tradition has tended to associate present 
devotional practice with ‘that which was appointed’ in the past.
38  For example, 
Hallisey cites the 13
th century Pūjāvaliya, which contains a metaphor equating the 
Buddha to a mother, who offers the Dharma like the milk of her breast.  Calling the 
passage “emotive” in its intention, Hallisey writes, “The metaphor “moved” the 
                                                 
34 Lutz and White, 420 
35 Ibid 
36 Lynch summarizes one important aspect of emotions accommodated by both social constructionism 
and emotional realism: “Emotional appraisals are constitutive for the individual and deeply involve, 
even more, the self in its relationships to social others, things, or events.  We speak of our deepest 
emotions as meaning ful.  The feeling does not move us, rather, the emotional appraisal is so full of 
meaning that it constitutes a moving experience for us.” (1990b), 9 
37 Deegalle (1997) delineates the “late medieval” period of Sri Lanka as spanning from the beginning of 
the Polonarrruva period to the fall of the Kandyan kingdom to the British, 993 1815.  Nearly all of the 
Sinhala literature under review in this thesis will fall between the 12
th and 15
th centuries.  Exceptions 
will be noted. 
38 As opposed to theistic religious systems which so often orient devotional practice and liturgy around 
prognostication (and the incumbent expectation).  
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authors, and other beings, from being alone, without protection or care, to being 
children who are loved and protected.”
39  These emotive elements serve to precipitate 
a sense of self involvement in the ongoing history of the consequences of the Buddha’s 
dispensation among those who read and hear the texts, thereby reinforcing their 
devotional attitude, two things which Hallisey to some degree equates: “when the 
strategies of self involvement bring to bear the resources of both thought and emotion 
to construct the impression, “I am involved,” then this self involvement should be 
called “devotion.”
40 
In conjunction with his work on the Sinhala va sas, Steven Berkwitz (2001, 
2003, 2004) pursues Hallisey’s argument, investigating at some length the mechanics 
and function of emotional evocation.  In so doing, Berkwitz posits a theory  of 
emotional responsiveness which ostensibly contravenes the most fundamental 
assumptions of rasa theory.  Following contemporary social constructionist theorists 
of emotion, Berkwitz argues that some Sinhala literature should be interpreted as an 
effort to forge emotional associations with the Buddha through a process of actively 
associating devotional practice with the Buddha’s long ago dispensation. 
Berkwitz argues that more than simply ‘inspiring’ devotion through fabulous 
accounts of the Buddha’s past deeds, the Sinhala va sas  work to associate ritualized 
activity with the notion that devotees are recipients of acts of generousity of the 
historical Buddha and other virtuous agents of the past.
41  The thought is that the texts 
render explicit the connection between the past deeds of the Buddha and the ability of 
readers/listeners to recognize and pursue soteriological fruits, thereby inducing a 
sense of gratitude and obligation.  The ritual of pūjā is then configured as an 
appropriate exhibition of this gratitude, thereby forging a connection to the past 
                                                 
39 Hallisey (1988), 258 
40 Ibid, 57 
41 Berkwitz (2001), 161; Berkwitz (2003)  
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which, “can be considered ‘ethical’ in that [it] display[s] a cognitive understanding of 
being a beneficiary of the past who is morally obligated to acknowledge one’s 
dependence on the Buddha for the ability to imagine and attain various Buddhist 
felicities.”
42 
              Berkwitz’s primary example is the Sinhala Thūpava sa, a 13
th century 
putatively historical chronicle attributed to Parākrama Pa  ita, wherein we read of 
kings realizing the Buddha’s forsight in ordaining that his relics might be spread far 
and wide, such that “the many beings who make offerings [to them] will enjoy the 
happiness of the divine world.”
43  This realization prompts the kings to build 
monasteries on the order of tens of thousands (Aśoka), or to build a poya hall 
“resembling a divine mansion for the monastic community.”
44  While the average 
devotee cannot of course afford such generousity, simple acts of veneration (such as 
the pūjā) are substituted as being appropriate displays of gratitude in the Sinhala 
Thūpava sa.
45  The text presents acts of veneration as acts of reciprocation towards 
the Buddha, and describes those readers and listeners who undertake veneration with 
this meaning in mind as having been transformed into satpuru as, or “virtuous 
persons.” 
              On account of this, according to Berkwitz,  
 
we can locate the origins of emotions not in the passive experience of an 
individual’s physiology but rather in the views and appraisals that people 
are endowed with in the course of sumitting themselves to cultural 
practices…the readers and listeners of Buddhist history are subjected to 
                                                 
42 Berkwitz (2001), 158 
43 Sinhala Thūpava sa, 72 3; (Berkwitz (2001), 161 
44 As Du ugämu u did upon learning that arahant Mahinda had predicted (ordained?) his ascension 
over a century earlier. (Sinhala Thūpava sa, 144; (Berkwitz (2001), 162)   
45 Berkwitz (2004), 271  
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certain emotions as a result of encountering historical narratives that 
descibe the world and their place in it.  The Sinhala Thūpava sa, in this 
way, works to inscribe particular emotions by supplying appraisals to 
situations in which their readers and listeners find themselves in relation 
to the past. (Berkwitz (2004), 242 3) 
 
The thought seems to be that, upon learning of the gratitude of kings towards the 
Buddha as described in the texts, devotees are conditioned to feel likewise, having 
made the same associations between the Buddha’s historical acts of generosity and 
their own situation as beings privy to the teaching of the Buddha, and its various 
attendant felicities.  Therefore, 
 
The frequent descriptions of emotional experiences felt by groups of 
devotees suggests that rather than being intensely personal, natural 
events, emotions are frequently crafted and conditioned by cultural 
appraisals of what people experience.
46 
 
              This should strike us of course as being directly opposed to the fundamental 
assumption of rasa theory that specific emotions are uniformly evoked by specific 
determinants (i.e., vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas).  Though it seems 
philosophically suspect to claim that all emotions are the product of social 
conditioning,
47 this is what Berkwitz appears to assert.  Though there are descriptions 
                                                 
46 Berkwitz (2004), 242 
47 Supposing that a person is born tabula rasa with respect to emotional response, and that she 
acquired such responsiveness solely through socially learned associations, would involve a conditioning 
process on order of:  Emotions arise haphazardly and without antecedent cause – a certain person, 
place or event would have to be presented at the same time as one such emotion arose, and some form 
of positive or negative reinforcement would have to be simultaneously issued to sustain this association.   
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of the Buddha in the Sinhala Thūpava sa which mimick the style of ala kāra 
influenced Sanskrit poetry, Berkwitz denies that these are simply intended to “please 
the minds of the audience.”  Significant are the emotional responses of the characters 
within the narrative, from which the audience (the real audience – the readers and 
hearers of the text) is to take its cues (reading for example in one instance that a 
character possessed “a mind that was pleased by considering the various similies”).
48  
Though the Sinhala Thūpava sa contains “some expressions that strongly resemble 
the ala kāras of Sanskrit poetics,”
49 Berkwitz urges us  
 
not to take the theories of Sanskrit poetics [alluded to in the text] at their 
word and simply conclude that the Sinhala Thūpava sa and analogous 
texts worked to “evoke” or “elicit” latent feelings of joy and gratitude 
from within the “hearts” of late medieval Buddhist devotees.
50 
 
He suggests alternatively that we interpret the emotions displayed by characters within 
the text “as dispositions that are crafted [in the reader or hearer] by the narrative 
itself.”
51 
*   *   * 
The following chapter will explore the relevance of presuppositions of emotional 
realism and emotional constructivism to Buddhist ethics, and their prevalence within 
both early Pāli and medieval Sinhala literature. 
 
 
                                                 
48 Berkwitz (2004), 240 
49 Ibid, 238 
50 Ibid, 240 
51 Ibid  
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              The tension between the perception of art and literature as possessing a 
practical, educative function and of being purely objects of aesthetic enjoyment have 
made fertile ground for creative distinctions and theoretical subtleties in South Asian 
intellectual thought.  Of specific relevance for the present section is the place 
accorded to the morally educative function of art and literature, which was seen as 
wholly distinct from, and indeed incommensurable with, the actual act of aesthetic 
appreciation.  Offering a (perhaps essentialized) summary of the position of ancient 
Indian aestheticians, Coomaraswamy writes, 
 
Of course, a work of art may and often does afford us at the same time 
pleasure in a sensuous or moral way, but this sort of pleasure is derived 
directly from its material qualities, such as tone or texture, assonance, 
etc., or the ethical peculiarity of its theme, and not from its aesthetic 
qualities: the aesthetic experience is independent of this, and may even, 
as Dhanamjaya says, be derived in spite of sensuous or moral 
displeasure.
52 
 
This is so because the experience of rasa is accompanied by a state of ‘self 
forgetfulness,’ or, on the interpretation of those advocating most extremely the 
religious functionality of art (e.g., Abhināvagupta), a state of transcendence of one’s 
own subjectivity.
53  The presumption seems to be that discursive reasoning, which is 
                                                 
52 Coomaraswamy (1924), 32 
53 See Cooper (1997)  
  16 
required for ethical judgment making, cannot take place at the height of aesthetic 
relish. 
              This is not to say however that literature (kāvya – that is, prose and poetry as 
distinct from for example itihāsa, historical works, or śāstra, treatise) was not 
perceived as having an ethically educative function.  It was thought to do so not by 
means of the aesthetic experience which it invoked, nor by direct didactic means, but 
rather through its potential to stimulate reflection upon morally educative situations.  
Sheldon Pollock tells us that kāvya 
 
does not expressly enjoin or define appropriate action, nor adduce an  
actual account of such action from the past as authority.  Its specificity 
resides precisely in the self sufficiency of the utterance [ukti] itself.
54  
 
Rather, literary works came to be perceived as expressing moral injunctions through 
their narratives taken as a whole.  Bhojarāja (a philosopher and aesthetician who 
ruled the central Indian kingdom of Malwa during the first half of the 11
th c.) states in 
his Ś  gāraprakāśa that, “The literary work is a sentence totality which causes us to 
understand what we should and should not do.”
55  Bhoja’s thought was that the gestalt 
of a literary work composed of words, sentences, and plot themes (each composed 
atomistically of the previous, and none themselves having a determinate real world 
referent or ethical import) had at least one moral point, which was a literary 
instantiation of one or more absolute moral imperatives.  (i.e., The Rāmāya a enjoins 
the reader to “act like Rāma, and not like Rāva a,” which affirms the wrongness in 
general of theft, adultery, etc.)  For Bhoja, literature was morally educative in offering 
                                                 
54 Pollock (2003b), 50 
55 Pollock (2001), 218; Ś  gāraprakāśa, 194.6  
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particular examples  which allow readers to cultivate a ‘moral consciousness.’  This 
Bhoja supposed to be 
 
the sole cause of attaining the four life goals,
56 and [that which] 
undergirds the cosmos.  It might rightly be called the beginningless and 
endless śabdabrahma transformed into the form of verbal meaning.
57 
 
              Jagannātha, a poeticist of the mid seventeenth century, departing from the 
ethical esotericism of Bhoja gives intriguing expression to the precise nature of the 
moral imperatives implicitly affirmed (and in turn “promulgated” by) literary works.  
In literature, the inappropriateness of a given character relationship or narrative event 
is “something people understand from social practices (vyavahārata ).”
58  Faults in 
literary composition amount to “transgression of the social order measured against a 
set of social norms.”
59  For Jagannātha, literature, and particularly the sentiments 
(rasas) embodied by certain character motifs, represented a “promulgation of an 
ideal typical social order.”
60  This may seem at first to give way to a kind of moral 
relativism, with literature reflecting only the mores and expectations of the culture in 
which it is composed.  We must be sensitive to the fact however that Sanskrit literati 
including Jagannātha believed there to be only one correct and immutable social 
order, ensuring the efficient governance of society and the most fulfilling lives for its 
members.  Perforce, kāvya was seen as expressing injunctions as to how to best fulfill 
                                                 
56 By which he means the four puru ārthas – dharma (righeousness), artha (wealth), kāma (physical 
pleasure), and mok a (spiritual emancipation) – the four acheivements corresponding to the four life 
stages which consititute a rightly lived life. 
57 Pollock (2001), 217 8; Bhoja, 471.16ff. 
58 Rasaga gādhara, 118 
59 Pollock (2001), 213 
60 Pollock (2001), 214.  Pollock refers to this sentiment as “social moral aesthetics,” which had a long 
history with varying degrees of explicitness among Indian literary theorists “extending from Bharata to 
Jagannātha.” (2001), 215  
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one’s social role in  the “ideal typical” order, and through becoming an accomplished 
reader, one cultivates an appreciation for one’s role and moral responsibilities in that 
order.  Pollock explains: 
 
when one learns what literature is, how it works and the canons by which 
it may be said to represent what is valid and invalid, when one learns to 
be a good reader, a rasika or a sah daya, one is learning what is 
normative in the everyday world.  To produce readers in Sanskrit 
literature is to produce certain social subjectivities.
61 
 
              It remained of course up to the audience to detect such compositional faults 
themselves.  Just as aesthetic receptivity was supposed to be universal and innate in 
rasa theory, so was sensitivity to the moral import of literature according to Indian 
philosophers and poeticists.  The following quotation from Bhoja is representative of 
this sentiment: 
 
It is a particular kind of insight (pratibhāviśe ana) as to the moral right 
and wrong generated in a person with innate receptivity 
(upahitasa skāra) by the act of contemplating the meanings of a literary 
work.
62 
      
      
      
                                                 
61 Ibid, 215.  Bharata early on affirms this supposition: “artha  pratiyojana  ca prītipurassara  
vyutpattimaya ,” (“The ‘meaning’ [of poetry] also signifies its purpose, which is moral instruction 
through a pleasurable experience.”) Nā yaśāstra , 265; Pollock’s translation (2001), 227 n.45  
62 Pollock (2001), 217 8;  Ś  gāraprakāśa, 471.16ff.  
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Narrative ethics  Narrative ethics  Narrative ethics  Narrative ethics and moral naturalism in early Pā and moral naturalism in early Pā and moral naturalism in early Pā and moral naturalism in early Pāli Buddhist literature li Buddhist literature li Buddhist literature li Buddhist literature 
              In their discussion of the canonical Pāli Buddhist scriptures, Charles Hallisey 
and Anne Hanson observe the manner in which these narratives express abstract 
moral truths while also fostering a “moral consciousness” operative on account of the 
reader’s own empathy.  Hallisey and Hanson offer an example from the Pāli 
commentary on the Dhammapada, a collection of aphorisms and stories included in 
the Pāli Buddhist canon.  The tale is of a barren women who, having become a servant 
in a noble household, out of jealousy poisons the madam of the home during three 
successive pregnancies, causing two miscarriages and finally the noblewoman’s 
demise.  Having realized servant’s deceit at the moment of her death, the noblewoman 
vows to haunt the servant in her next life, ensuring that she too will not successfully 
have a child.  The servant is reborn as a hen, and the noblewoman as a cat who eats all 
of the hen’s eggs.  The hen vows revenge in her next life, and is reborn as a tigress who 
eats the fawns of a doe (the noblewoman).  The cycle of revenge continues as the 
servant is reborn as a noblewomen and the noblewoman as a demoness (named Kālī), 
who devours two of the servant now noblewoman’s children.  The servant now 
noblewoman, fearful of the same fate for her third child, brings him to the Buddha 
where she lays him at his feet.  The Buddha then requests that the noblewoman hand 
over the child to the demoness, whom he has summoned.  The terrified noblewoman 
complies, astonished that the demoness having caressed and returned the child to her 
begins to weep.
63   
  Hallisy and Hanson point out that the re birth and revenge segment of the 
story expresses a general “moral truth” expressed in aphoristic form elsewhere in the 
Dhammapada: “Hatreds can never cease by hatred” (Dhammapada, v.5).  They 
contend further however that the conclusion of the narrative offers a moral lesson 
                                                 
63 Hallisey and Hanson, 314 15  
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through what comes to be the reader’s involvement in the story and empathy with the 
demoness.  The narrative exacts a “transfer in the imagination” from the reader to “a 
person who is morally opposite” them.
64  Such narratives serve as exercises for 
cultivating just this sort of capacity for imagination which is, according to the two 
authors, “essential for ethical action.”
65  This is so for two reasons:  Firstly because 
narratives and the imagination they nurture “can help us better perceive the generic 
nature of persons, such that we are better able to perceive universal obligations and 
rights in a world characterized by social diversity.”  Secondly because “narrative form 
portrays “complex nets of deeds and attributes”
66 [of others] in a manner that 
inevitably requires sympathy on our [i.e., the readers’] part,”
67 so that when we are in 
turn confronted with real world situations requiring us to make judgments involving 
moral appraisals we will for example be restrained in our censure of another by first 
being compelled to empathize with his or her life circumstances. 
  The ethically educative component which Hallisey and Hanson extract from 
early Pāli Buddhist literature corresponds to that of Sanskrit literature in that the 
ethical import of both genres – the particular lessons and general maxims in the case 
of Sanskrit literature, and the particular lessons, general maxims and “moral 
consciousness” in the case of early Buddhist literature – is derived by the reader after 
some amount of conscious reflection on the narratives as a whole.  That is, the lessons 
and maxims of Sanskrit literature, and the maxims and imaginative reasoning 
involving the “complex nets of deeds and attributes” emerge only when the narratives 
in which they are contained are read in their entirety (or at least in all essential detail) 
                                                 
64 Ibid, 315 
65 Ibid, 316 
66 Their quotation from Carrithers, 82 
67 Hallisey and Hanson, 316  
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and considered – not through sporadic or epiphanic realization at intermittent points 
within the narrative.   
*  *  * 
In an innovative reading of early Pāli Buddhist Literature, Maria Heim 
discerns therein a conceptual framework for understanding the mechanics of emotion 
which parallels the most fundamental assumptions of rasa theory.  The Buddha’s acts 
of inordinate self sacrifice in previous incarnations described in the Pāli Jatakas are 
intended make a visceral impact upon the reader, sometimes to the point of 
horripilation (as for instance the Bodhisattva’s memorable “gifts of body” (dehadāna) 
– in one incarnation as King Śibi giving away his eyes to a blind Brahmin, in another 
slicing up his own body to give to a to group of hungry ogres as food).  The visceral 
intensity of these actions is sometimes registered not only by other characters in the 
story, but also by unusual natural phenomenon, such as earthquakes and the rolling of 
the oceans.  Heim identifies in this what she calls “moral naturalism” – the notion that 
“the world is so ordered that it responds to moral acts.”
68  This she associates with the 
presupposition apparent in the literature that likewise all individuals possess uniform 
receptivity to certain types of acts – or at least that we should if we are to recognize 
morally praiseworthy actions, and/or, as will be discussed shortly, if we are to be 
receptive to the renunciatory impetus given by such passages. 
              Though similar to the notion of innate receptivity (upahitasa skāra) to the 
moral import of narrative as discussed by Bhoja, an important difference must be 
stressed: the moral receptivity which Bhoja and other Indian poeticists referred to 
took place only during reflection upon the totality of the narrative at hand.   The 
moral realization of the witnesses to the virtues of the Buddha (presumably meant to 
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be the appropriate response of the reader) happens instantaneously, and in a fashion 
automatically, requiring no time for any discursive reflection on narrative context, etc. 
              Emotional realism may be shown to have significant relevance to Buddhist 
ethical considerations.  Firstly and most straightforwardly, alerting one to actions 
which are of immense meritorious quality further alerts one to the fact that the 
performer of these acts is one of advanced spiritual stature, and worthy of reverence 
(though perhaps not always to be imitated, as in the case of sacrificing one’s body to 
hungry demons).  The second is the moral reflection which intense emotions can 
induce after the fact.  Such emotional reactions are enduring, both in the mind of the 
individual reader/hearer of the narrative and within the Buddhist community through 
which the narratives are transmitted.  Commenting on a passage in which Nagasena 
points out that the Bodhisattva’s deeds of many years past are still being recounted 
today, Heim remarks, “The moral power of fame is also in evidence here.  Emotional 
impact is not conceived as fleeting or transitory but, rather, endures for a long time 
and thus stimulates memory, ideals, and moral deliberation.”
69  Quoting several 
examples from Buddhist Pāli texts, Heim illustrates how the feeling of fear may 
“replace complacency with [religious] urgency,”
70 or sa vega, impelling one on the 
path to renunciation.  She comments, 
 
It is a feeling that the [Buddha] delivering his speeches inspires among 
deities in the heavens in exactly the same way the lion’s roar causes 
brutes of the forest to quake in fear.  The gods realize their 
impermanence and vulnerability, which is a moment of fear and 
agitation.
71 
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71 Heim, 546  
  23 
 
              Heim does not address the counter possibility that the passages in question 
are meant to be prescriptive, that is, that they may be intended to instruct the reader 
in an appropriate mode of response to a certain event, as opposed to merely reflecting 
the presumed normal response (as Berkwitz assumes to be the case for passages in the 
Sinhala Thūpava sa).  While I cannot definitely establish an emotional realist 
orientation in early Pāli literature (and some evidence in chapter three may 
contravene this possibility), the thought is given credence in the notion found in 
canonical texts that there is a correct way to augment or “flavor” a discourse in order 
that its “true meaning” (its substantive, philosophical/soteriological import (attha)) 
may be discerned.  In the A guttara Nikāya, the Buddha exhorts that the “True Law” 
(saddhamma) will be preserved when a monk is “in full possession” of a discourse, 
“with well put verses and flavorings (sunikkhittehi pada vyañjanehi): for, [Oh monks], 
if verses and their flavorings are well put, the practical meaning is likewise easy to 
follow.”
72   
 
Developments in  Developments in  Developments in  Developments in Medieval Medieval Medieval Medieval Sinhala Buddhist literature  Sinhala Buddhist literature  Sinhala Buddhist literature  Sinhala Buddhist literature      
              We turn now to the Sinhala literature of the 13
th to 15
th centuries CE, a period 
which saw a revival of the vernacular literary tradition in Sri Lanka, and during which 
a prodigious amount of Sinhala prose literature was produced.  In the literature of this 
period we find a departure from the notions of the innateness of aesthetic and moral 
receptivity found in the antecedent Pāli and Sanskrit literary traditions.  Possible 
socio historical causes for this apparent change in sentiment will be the subject of the 
next chapter.  Here I will offer instances from various literary genres of the period 
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which suggest that suitable moral and aesthetic responsiveness to literature must be 
cultivated. 
              I must first make clear that while such emotional and moral constructivism 
appears as something new during the medieval period, it is not to the total exclusion of 
the former sentiments of emotional realism and moral naturalism.  Reminiscent of 
those Heim discusses from the early Pāli literature, we find a passage from the early 
13
th century Amāvartura in a section recounting the conversion of the god Śakra 
adapted from a Jataka story: 
 
‘blessed are we that have given [the Buddha] a spoonful of gruel or a 
ladleful of rice,’ and they rejoiced and were glad, and with hair that rose up 
on their bodies, as it were in blossom, they stood and worshipped, with their 
hands clasped above their heads.”
73   
 
              In addition, like the Sanskrit literature which was believed to convey essential 
truths about morality and the means by which to live one’s life to the fullest (i.e., the 
four puru ārthas), Sinhala literature of the period provided knowledge of some 
essential laws of governance (both of oneself and of others) and pedagogy.  Consider 
the following quotation from Mayūrapāda Buddhaputra, wherein he explains the 
usefulness of his Pūjāvaliya – an assemblage of stories of the Buddha’s life in Sinhala 
prose (the last two chapters being a history of Sri Lanka) written in the early to mid 
13
th century – to ‘deputy kings and ministers, who might learn the 
 
laws of the king (rājanīti), laws of the world (lōkanīti), laws of the 
teaching (dharmanīti), conventions of the world (lōkavyavahāra), 
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conventions of the teaching (dharmavyavahāra), and conventions of land 
(deśavyavahāra), and about this and other worlds.
74 
 
  However, Sinhala Buddhist literature of the medieval period contains 
noticeable shifts in its presuppositions regarding the innateness of aesthetic 
responsiveness and possibly also the universality of the moral imperatives advocated 
by some texts.  These shifts are contemporaneous with an apparent emerging self 
awareness within the texts of the roles of author and audience, and the means by 
which authors acquire the skill and authority to impact the audience aesthetically, and 
to educate them morally. 
To take an example from an historiographic text, according to Steven 
Berkwitz,  “The Sinhala Thūpava sa claims for itself the aesthetic capacity to effect 
certain emotional and ethical responses in an audience,”
75 as the text “supplies us with 
several hints as to how persons are expected to react when they read or listen to a 
recital of its narrative.”
76  Though declaring that the Thūpava sa “gives rise to 
emotions that are productive of a moral subjectivity in those who encounter its 
narrative”
77 (a statement seemingly reminiscent of the claims of Hallisey and Hanson 
regarding early Pāli literature), Berkwitz refers not to emotions triggered 
automatically  by the narrative, but to those which the narrative attempts to configure, 
and to a “moral subjectivity” which is not the “ethical imagination” of Hallisey and 
Hanson (which is a means to realizing universal (i.e., “objective”) standards of 
morality), but rather a “subjective” understanding (i.e., understood from the 
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76 Ibid, 156 
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standpoint of the subject (the reader)) of one’s reciprocative obligations as they are 
established by the narrative. 
  The ambivalence between the primacy of the innate as opposed to the 
acquired ability to compose aesthetically stimulating literature seems to have been 
decided in favor of its acquired character among medieval Sinhala literati.  The 
Siyabas Lakara (see chapter 1) holds that though one may be deficient in inborn 
genius (Sin. pi iban, Skt. pratibhāna) one may become a great poet through study and 
exercise.  Tarrying from the medieval period slightly, but to a text which reflects much 
of the literary sentiment of the preceding era, the 16
th century Suba ita of 
Alagiywanna Mukeveti likens the learning process involved in creating great poetry to 
the trial of childbirth: 
 
Only great poets know good and bad with respect to versification, 
Could the mediocre and fradulent have such education? 
Women having borne children only know labor’s pain, 
Could childless young women be on the same plane?
78 
 
Again the Siyabas Lakara asks, 
 
How can those who have not studied the śāstras distinguish bettween 
what is excellent [guna] and what is a blemish [dosha]; does the blind 
person have the capacity to perceive the differences in visual objects?
79 
 
                                                 
78 Adapted from Perera’s translation of Subashita, v. 8 
79 Hallisey (2003), 701; Siyabas Lakara, I. 9  
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              Medieval Sri Lankan literati saw this formal knowledge of literary composition 
as associated with progress on the path to emancipation – both for authors and for 
their audiences.  The following passages are adjacent to the above: 
 
Language is like a wish conferring cow that gives what is desirable to those 
who can use it in the proper manner, but for others it will only impart 
bovine qualities… 
 
Therefore the learned men of old who were driven by the desire to 
enlighten the world composed treatises for those who were bringing forth 
[entering] the beautiful path [visituru magga; Skt. vicitra mārga].
80  
 
According to the Siyabas Lakara, it is receptivity to universal features of the aesthetics 
of language – a receptivity acquired through careful study of “learned men of old” – 
which fulfills one’s wishes, ultimately precipitating one’s journey on “the beautiful 
path,” the path to enlightenment.   
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Chapter 3: Literature, cosmopolitanism and kingship in medieval Sri Lanka medieval Sri Lanka medieval Sri Lanka medieval Sri Lanka      
      
A sermon for the common man (and woman) A sermon for the common man (and woman) A sermon for the common man (and woman) A sermon for the common man (and woman) 
Whereas nearly all of the antecedent Buddhist literature – canonical and 
exegetical – had been composed in Pāli, the 12
th century brought the composition of 
Buddhist texts in the local Sri Lankan language of Sinhala.  While some of this 
vernacular literature strictly adhered to the established formats of Sanskrit treatise 
and poetry, the period also saw the ascendence of a new and unique type of Buddhist 
literature corresponding to that of a new mode of Buddhist preaching: ba a, the 
public reading from Sinhala texts known as ba apot (‘preaching texts’). 
Rather than doctrinal exegesis, the principle subjects of these ba apot were 
the Jātakas of the Pāli canon – the stories of the Buddha Gotama in his previous 
incarnations as humans of all walks of life, and even as various animals.  The 
translation of the nearly 550 Jataka stories of the canon into Sinhala was itself 
considered a ba apot.
81  The texts served to valorize the Buddha in many aspects – his 
wisdom, his compassion, and at times in his lives of martial and royal leadership.  
Ba apot emphasized the necessity of reverence for the Buddha, and frequently 
extolled the immense karmic benefits of even small offerings (such as a withered 
flower or old piece of fruit) to the Buddha, and small gifts (a bowl of rice or a piece of 
cloth) to the Sangha (the community of monks).
82 
The primary intended audience of ba apot were “unlearned, virtuous people” 
(no viyat hudī jana) as declared for example by Guru ugomi in the Amāvatura, the 
                                                 
81 Deegalle (2006), 17 
82 In the narratives of the ba apot these are given to the historical Buddha and his Sangha, but the 
obvious implication is the admonition to give alms to the current Sangha, and to make offerings (pūjas) 
to icons of the Buddha, his relics, and his other physical representations such as Bodhi trees.  These 
practices continue in Sri Lanka to the present day.  
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first known ba apot composed in approximately 1200.
83  According to Mahinda 
Deegalle, the term used here for unlearned, noviyat, “referred to people who neither 
knew several languages nor had accumulated knowledge through formal studies under 
a teacher.”
84  According to Sorata Thera, the term for virtuous, hudī, derives from the 
Sanskrit sudhī, which has both the substantive and adjectival meanings of ‘a wise or 
learned man’ or ‘a religious or pious person,’ or ‘wise’ or ‘pious.’
85  Though interesting 
to note here the close association of notions of piety and learning, to avoid 
contradiction with noviyat it seems preferrable to take hudī in the sense of merely 
‘pious,’ or, more broadly and in accordance with other applications of the word, as 
‘virtuous.’  Hudīkusalkam refers to the “meritorious deeds of virtuous people,” and a 
hudīpirimnī  to a “virtuous man.”
86   
Sorata Thera gives the term “virtuous person” (satpuru ayā) itself as an 
equivalent to hudī.
87  Thus we may infer that the intended audience of Amāvatura 
were those “virtuous people” into which the Sinhala Thūpava sa hoped to render its 
audience according to Berkwitz (see chapter 1).  However, a passage from the 
Pūjāvaliya (a ba apota nearly contemporary to Amāvatura) suggests the contrary 
while raising some interesting issues.  The author ennumerates eight groups of people 
by whom Pūjāvaliya should be read or heard, along with the direct benefits specific to 
                                                 
83 The complete quotation reads: “Having selected the term purisadammasārathī, I shall narrate briefly 
in the vernacular [siyabasin, ‘my own/one’s own language’; i.e., Skt. svabhā ā], for the edification of the 
virtuous and unlearned, how the Buddha, having fulfilled the perfections, attained enlightenment and 
then accepted the Devram monastery, and how living there he traversed the three worlds and 
subjugated various beings and directed them to nirvana.” Wijemanne, 4; see Amāvatura, 1 
84 Deegalle (2006), 71 
85 Sorata Thera, 1171; Deegalle (2006), 71; Monier Williams, 1225 
86 Deegalle (2006), 71 
87 Sorata Thera, 1171.  The reference for this specific translation Sorata Thera gives as being from the 
Dhampiyāa uvāgä apadaya [sic], the oldest surviving Sinhala glossary on a Pali book (in this case the 
Vinaya Pitaka), attributed to King Kassapa V (913 923 CE).  See Godakumbara (1955).  
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each of them.  The last mention is of “pious men and women in remote provinces,” 
concerning whom it is explained: 
 
Because pious (śraddhāvanta) men and women, who live in very 
remote provinces (prayanta) do not have an opportunity to see any 
virtuous person (satpuru a), it is very difficult for them to listen to ba a 
and thereby to know about this and other worlds.  Therefore, they can 
obtain a book of this sort which describes the virtues of the Buddha 
(budugu a) and can ask persons who are able to read to read them this 
text (ak arābhāsaya ätiya vun lavā kiyavā).  By listening to such 
readings, they can know correctly (nirvyākula) the virtues of the 
Buddha in their own language (svabhā ā).
88 
 
These men and women are presumably also the “virtuous but unlearned” to whom the 
Amāvatura was directed (being illiterate they are clearly unlearned, and recalling the 
connotation of piousness contained in hudī we may infer that śraddhāvanta here 
carries a similar implication).  The “virtuous person” specifically referred to in the 
passage is the satpuru a, who appears to be a denizen of a more cosmopolitan climate.  
Obviously there must be more implied by the term than mere literacy, as the passage 
assumes that illiterate men and women have contact with those who can read, but not 
with satpuru as.  But apparently too there is more intimated by the term than 
                                                 
88 Deegalle (1997), 191 (punctuation modified); Pūjāvaliya (1965), 19.  In the story of the monk 
Cakkhupāla from the Saddharmaratnāvaliya recognize that the chance to listen to sermons is 
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virtuousness qua mere pious receptivity (which, the passage indicates, men and 
women in remote provinces already possess).
89 
The other seven catagories of intended recipients of the Pūjāvaliya 
Buddhaputra names as (1) kings; (2) the “world of women,” meaning here women of 
status such as noble women and queens; (3) the deputy king and the ministers; (4) 
senior monks (Mahāsthaviras); (5) meditators, referring to monks who are “unable to 
master the ways of reading and writing (ak arābhyāsa); (6) eloquent preachers 
(inscriptional evidence indicates that these could be either monks or laymen
90); and 
(7) “virtous worldly (kalyā a p thagjana) people who are able to master the way of 
reading and writing.”
91   
 
Expectations, great and small Expectations, great and small Expectations, great and small Expectations, great and small      
Whether or not one is willing to concede that medieval Sinhala texts such as 
the Sinhala Thūpava sa were composed with the intention of conditioning the 
emotional responses of its readers, it is certain that the literature of the period – 
historiographic, liturgic, and poetic – emphasized the importance of emotional 
involvement in religious practice over meditation and doctrinal study.  Berkwitz’s 
comment that the Sinhala Thūpava sa “emphasizes the cultivation of productive 
emotional states and the performance of meritorious acts over the practice of 
meditation as a means for many people to secure greater happiness and eventual 
release from the world of sa sāra,”
92 might be extended to Sinhala ba apot as well. 
This was true at least for the primary audience of ba apot: the pious and 
virtuous but unlearned.  As has been discussed already in brief however, the 
                                                 
89 Ames comments that the satpuru a in Sri Lankan Buddhist society refers simply to a “self perfected 
individual,” i.e., one who has attained an advanced state in meditative practice. (p. 25) 
90 See Deegalle (1997), 185 
91 Deegalle (1997), 189 91; Pūjāvaliya (1965), 17 19 
92 Berkwitz (2004), 264  
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Pūjāvaliya indicates expectations of varying sophistication for different audience 
demographics.  Here, the complexity of one’s task seems correlated with the depth of 
one’s learning.  Just by reading Pūjāvaliya deputy kings and ministers will learn “laws 
of the king (rājanīti), laws of the world (lōkanīti), laws of the teaching (dharmanīti), 
conventions of the world;” elder monks will awaken their “moon like wisdom;” and 
eloquent preachers will “decorate their own rivers like power of words (vākpatha) in 
their preaching.”
93  A relevant discussion of the expectations and duties of kings in 
medieval Sri Lanka will follow below. 
Deegalle refers to the admonitions of ba apot for the pious, virtuous 
unlearned – presumably the peasantry – as “easy methods of worshipping.”
94  While 
we might differ from using such a strongly normative description, the point seems 
clear.  The Pūjāvaliya reveals something of a hierarchy within the medieval Buddhist 
world, if in no other terms than an ideal type.  Along with the conspicuous political 
hierarchy of kings, administrators and peasantry, there is a corresponding hierarchy 
based on literacy, expectation to further engage in Buddhist teaching/preaching, and, 
as the above discussion of the satpuru a suggests, of moral authority and geographical 
location (urban or rural). 
              The emergence of these hierarchies, along with the popularization of the 
emotional sentiment and devotional worship which permeate the literature will be 
explored at greater depth in the subsequent two chapters.  Relevant will be the notion 
of devotional sentiment as a means to emancipation (bhakti yoga) – whether or not 
this was explicitely stated or even believed in the Sri Lankan Buddhist context – which 
held significant prominence in the Indian religious world during the Sri Lankan 
medieval period.   
                                                 
93 Deegalle (1997), 189 91; Pūjāvaliya (1965), 17 19 
94 Deegalle (2004), 85  
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The literature of the period also revealed a conspicuous need for the 
continuation of the Teaching in the absence of the teacher.  The next two sections will 
address responses to this dilemma.  This set of considerations will involve the role of 
the Buddhist king – both the idealized personage of literature and actual kings of 
history – as a substitute for the Buddha qua teacher and ruler.      
      
The Buddha as Lord of Sages The Buddha as Lord of Sages The Buddha as Lord of Sages The Buddha as Lord of Sages 
To understand the role and expectations of teachers as portrayed in the 
Buddhist literary world, we must first understand the Buddha as teacher. 
As early as the canonical Pāli scriptures the Buddha’s instruction was 
described as having been exceedingly pleasing to listen to – he was repeatedly referred 
to as “Best among speakers” (Vadata  varo).  His sermons were “charming in the 
beginning, charming in the middle, charming in the end, rich in content (sāttha ) and 
form (savyañjana).”
95  According to Buddhagho a, the famed 5
th century Pāli 
commentator, “sāttha  is the clarification, enunciation, illustration, analysis, 
elucidation, assertion and being consisted of words appropriate to the meaning.”
96  It 
in other words refers to the conceptual precision of the Buddha’s speech.   (He was 
said to be a “keen analyst of concepts” (vibhajjavādī) and adept at introducing the 
finer shades of meaning of words.
97)  Savyañjana literally means “possessing 
ornaments,” in this case denoting “figurative expression” perhaps in the sense of the 
Buddha’s accumen for teaching through parables, and his sensitivity to the 
receptivities and backgrounds of his audiences (as opposed to “rhetorical 
embellishment” or ala kāra (see chapter 1)). 
                                                 
95 Deegalle (2006), 22.  This description occurs a number of times within the Pali canon: at Vin.I.35, 
242; DN.III.267, 285; MN.I.179, SN.I.105, IV.315; AN.I.180, II. 147, III.113, 135, 262. 
96 Takakusu and Nagal, 127; Deegalle (2006), 23 
97 Dhadphale, 7  
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  While his speech is described as “pleasant and delightful” (sammodanīyā and 
sārānīyā), the Buddha of the Pāli canon warns of the danger of rhetorical 
embellishment occluding the philosophical aspects of discourse.  With a tone of 
ominous claivoyance he declares in A isutta of the Sa yutta Nikāya: 
 
Like the Ā aka drum of the Dasārahas, in which the drum head vanished, 
leaving only the framework of pegs, even so it is with the suttantas [i.e., the 
sūtras or discourses] of the Tathāgata which are deep in meaning.  They lie 
neglected and forgotton while men turn their attention to the suttantas of 
poets and the utterances of the disciples, full of words [cittavyañjanā]; these 
they will learn and master instead of the Buddha’s own teachings.
98 
 
              It was the savyañjana character of the Buddha’s preaching which was 
emphasized in the subsequent Pāli and medieval Sinhala literatary traditions.  Later 
authors had few reservations about ascribing to him profound rhetorical artistry, and 
in his eloquence he was likened to a poet: 
 
With a voice sweet [miyurasa] like the song of a cuckoo, 
The ocean of wisdom and virtue [gu a] uttered these sweet words, 
Which had various parts well decorated with ornaments of sounds and meaning  
[akaratlakarin, Skt. śabdāla kāra arthāla kāra]. 
Then the multitude of monks, who were delighted and keen on hearing more, 
Begged for that [jātaka] story.  The Omniscient One presented in a language 
shared by all [siyalā hā bas; i.e., Pāli] 
this sermon imbued with transforming flavor [rasa], 
                                                 
98 Dhadpale 14 15; Sa yutta Nikāya, ii. 222  
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with words resplendent with color and clarity 
and pure with their finish of the Four Noble Truths like a painting.
99 
 
              The notion of the Buddha’s ability to discern the receptivity of his audience to 
ideas of various levels of abstractness (and thereby to instruct in the most effective 
way possible) was retained from the Pāli scriptures, though exaggerated to hyperbolic 
lengths.  He preached after 
 
having discerned the minds of all the people [in his audience] in an instant, 
in a span shorter than the blink of an eye, in the audience which [was so 
large that it] extended up to the Brahma heaven.
100 
 
As the “Lord of sages,”
101 he was described as knowing every language of every 
creature of the world, “capturing the minds of each” with his eloquence in Tamil, the 
“Brahmin language,” Malaysian, Chinese, etc., and the languages of fish, elephants, 
bears, horses, and cows., etc.
102 
 
King as Buddha, king as preacher, king as poet King as Buddha, king as preacher, king as poet King as Buddha, king as preacher, king as poet King as Buddha, king as preacher, king as poet 
We have seen in the above section the soteriological importance ascribed to 
the Buddha’s aesthetic sensitivity in both early Pāli and subsequent texts.  There was 
however a recognition among Sri Lankan Buddhists of the medieval period that the 
                                                 
99 Kāvyaśekhara 1.127 28; Hallisey’s translation, (2003), 705.  Late Pali Buddhist literature also 
employed sophisticated poetic devices as illustrated in the Subodhāla kāra, a 12
th century Sri Lankan 
treatise on Pali figures of speech in verses pertaining to the Buddha (none of them drawn from the Pali 
canon however, presumably on account of its overall stylistic simplicity).  See Dhadphale, 7.  
100 Butsara a, 45.  I am grateful to Prof. Anne Blackburn for her assistance with the translation of this 
text. 
101 Sasa Da Vata, v. 175 
102 Butsara a, 45  
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Buddha had long since passed out of the world, and that while his teachings, his 
“Dhamma,” were preserved in the form of scripture, new teachers  were required to 
actually communicate it (something which the Buddha was percieved to have done so 
well).  Thus the task of religious instruction fell upon others, the ranks of whom the 
above discussion of ba a preaching began to unfold.  The Pūjāvaliya mentions for 
example “eloquent preachers,”
103 and the somewhat vague satpuru a whom we may 
infer to be an individual able in religious instruction, and somehow “virtuous” in more 
than the provincial sense. 
It was however the king who was to replace the Buddha more than any other 
figure in Sri Lankan Buddhist literature, both in his capacity as ruler and as teacher.  
The canonical Pāli literature introduces the ideal Buddhist king through the character 
of the cakravartin – the “universal monarch” (literally a “wheel turner”).  While the 
term has a more ancient Sanskrit history, the cakravartin
104 is first given Buddhist 
expression in the Cakkavatti Sīhanāda Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya.  Here the Buddha 
recounts the tale of Mahāsudassana, a king who, having retired to the upper story of 
his palace to observe the uposatha, the monthly Buddhist holy day, looks out to see his 
city beleaguered with licentious behavior.  At this point a heavenly wheel appears 
before the king, which he is able to instruct, saying “Roll onward, O my Lord the 
wheel…go forth, and overcome.”  The wheel rolls one by one through the four 
surrounding regions, wherein the ruling King of each submits to Mahāsudassana, 
saying, “all is thine, O mighty king!  Do thou, O mighty king be a Teacher to us.”  
Mahāsudassana then teaches them the five Buddhist precepts of morality after which 
                                                 
103 The “great Pa  its skilled in preaching and learned in the various doctrines of the Buddhist sūtras” 
(no ek sūtrāntayan ige a ba a kīmehi dak a vū maha pa  ivarayan).  My translation of Pūjāvaliya (1999 
[1953]), 18. 
104 Which Zimmer translates as he who “sets the wheel of the world pacifying monarch in motion.” (S. 
Tambiah, 2)  
  37 
they abdicate and become his willing subjects.
105  This bloodless consummation of the 
cakravartin’s rule is known as the Dharma vijaya, or “righteous conquest.” 
In the Pāli literature, the cakravartin is repeatedly conflated with the Buddha 
himself.  In the Mahāpadāna and Mahāparinibbāna suttas, both the Buddha and the 
cakravartin are said to possess the same 32 auspicious bodily marks, and to both be 
“lion like” and to possess a “lion’s roar.”
106  According to the tradition, it was 
predicted at his birth that Siddhartha Gotama was either to become such a “universal 
monarch” (cakravartin) or an enlightened one (a “Buddha”).   
The cakravartin appears in medieval Sinhala literature as an archetypal ideal 
of kingship, but one in relation to which the historical Buddhist kings of Sri Lanka are 
portrayed through panegyrics and historiography as representing closely in some 
respects.  Relevant to note also is the conflation of historical kings with the Buddha 
himself.  For example, a 10
th century inscription commissioned by King Mahinda IV 
declares that none but future Buddhas will become kings of Sri Lanka.
107  King 
Nissa ka Malla, who ruled in the late 12
th century, declared that the appearance of an 
impartial king should be understood and welcomed as an appearance of the 
Buddha.
108   
Chapter two concluded by noting the contiguity of the themes of learnedness 
with respect to the rules of composition and the capacity for emancipatory attainment 
(i.e., escape from the suffering of sa sāra) in medieval Sinhala literature.  In the case 
of poems and panegyrics concerning kings, capacity as a just and efficacious ruler and 
as a teacher of the means to emancipation was associated with these two 
                                                 
105 Ibid, 11 12; Having the Dhamma as his master, the cakravartin      “dwells having conquered this sea 
girt land without stick or sword, by the law.” (Dīgha Nikāya (1947) iii, 58) 
106 S. Tambiah, 7 
107 Ganawardhana, 57; Epigraphia Zeylanica, Vol. I.(p.)237. The Cūlava sa records several Sri Lankan 
kings to have achieved the virtues of a Bodhisattva, presaging too that “none but Bodhisattvas would 
become kings of prosperous Lankā.” (Gunawardhana, 57; Cv. 37.109; 37.180) 
108 Ariyapala (1968 [1956]), 44; Epigraphia Zeylanica, 2.3.121  
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accomplishments.  Kings, both the historical subjects of eulogy and those of the 
extended kāvya poems supposed to be accounts of the Buddha’s life in previous 
incarnations, were depicted as possessing remarkable skill in oration – one capable of 
inducing bliss in any who hear, and one intimately associated with their efficacy as 
rulers.  The ideal king of Sinhala literature Charles Hallisey identifies as a stereotyped 
character: the ““world conqueror” (cakravartin), able to transform the world 
affectively and practically through the skillful use of refined literary techniques.”
109   
              The Pärakumbasirita, a fifteenth century poem, records of King 
Parākramabāhu VI, “Listening to [his] entirely enjoyable words [numutu rasa bas 
äsuva] brings at once the bliss of heaven.”
110  In another panegyric of the same king by 
the same author we read: 
 
Knowing the Lord of Sages’ threefold word [te valā munindu baņa], he put 
aside evil. 
He crossed the ocean of poetry and drama and the arts of war [avi sip], 
crushed the pride of fierce foes with his knowledge of strategy [upā näņa; 
Skt. upāya jñāna], 
and brought all of the island of Lanka to the shelter of a single parasol.
111 
 
The passage succinctly reveals the ability of a grasp of a concentrated knowledge (the 
“threefold word”) to at once achieve competence in poetry and drama, to conquer 
foes in battle, to unify the kingdom politically, and to achieve religious emancipation.  
Crossing “the ocean of poetry and drama and the arts of war” recalls the simile of 
                                                 
109 Hallisey (2003), 718 
110 Hallisey (2003), ff.701; Pärakumbasirita, v.29 
111 Hallisey (2003), 708; Sālalihinisandēśaya v.3 in Siri Rahul Pabanda  
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‘crossing the ocean of samsāra,’ which the king does “knowing the three fold word” – 
the triple gem of the Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha. 
  As recorded in a number of sources, preaching the Buddhist Dhamma was 
expected of Sri Lankan kings, and something they appear to have actually done.  An 
inscription of Nissa ka Malla’s enjoins kings, as proper Buddhists, to perform daily 
ten items of meritorious action (dasa pinkiriya vat), including among them ba a 
preaching (ba a kīma).
112  The Mahāva sa records that as early as the 1
st century 
BCE King Du ugämu u attempted to preach the Ma galasutta to a group of monks, 
though he was unable to ‘on account of reverence for the brotherhood [of monks].’
113  
A slab inscription records that King Kassapa V (ruling in the early 10
th century) 
“preached that same dhamma in the presence of his esteemed teacher, and extolled 
the virtues of the Buddha in his own language.”
114 
In addition to being the primary patrons of learning and the arts, kings 
themselves were in many cases accomplished scholars and authors.  A number of 
noteable treatises and poems are attributed to Sinhala kings of the medieval period.  
Among these is the 12
th century Kavsilumi a attributed to King Parākramabāhu II.  
This work, regarded as one of the greatest accomplishments of Sinhala poetry, will 
allow us to explore further the cakravartin’s related knowledge of compositional 
aesthetics and statecraft.   
The Kavsilumi a was composed in Sinhala in a style imitative of Sanskrit court 
poetry (praśasti).  Laden with lyrical and phonetic acrobatics, these mahākāyvas were 
richly evocative in content – from their portrayals of vivid bacchanalia to triumphal 
military campaigns, the rasas induced by these poems were anything but vimutti. 
                                                 
112 Ariyapala (1968 [1956]), 48 9; Epigraphia Zeylanica, 2.3.119 
113 Ariyapala (1968 [1956]), 49; Mahāva sa, 32.42 
114 Ariyapala (1968 [1956]), 49; Epigraphia Zeylanica, 1.2.43.  Italics added.  The Sinhala reads, “äjara 
hamuyehi eme dham desum viyakhan ka a siyabasnen bud gu a vänū.”  
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The Kavsilumi a portrays the Buddha in a former birth in as Prince Kusa, the 
immensely gifted but physically repulsive heir to a vast kingdom.  Inclined towards the 
renunciant life, Kusa agrees to marry only if his parents are able to find a bride of 
beauty matching that of a statue which he himself sculpts, one so lifelike that it is 
repeatedly mistaken for a woman of goddess like appearance.  Having launched an 
extensive search, Pabhāvati, the daughter of King Madra, is decided upon as an 
adequate suitor.  Kusa and Pabhāvati are married, though on account of the 
legerdemain of Kusa’s mother never actually see one another.  The remainder of the 
story recounts Kusa’s desperate attempts to win Pabhāvati’s love, she having 
discovered his true appearance.  Kusa’s exploits involve his attempts to woo her with 
his superlative skills in music, pottery, weaving, gardening, and cooking.  His amorous 
advances are however repeatedly foiled by his ineptitude in actually speaking to her.  
When, feigning injury lying in Pabhāvati’s lap she finally warms up to him, he opens 
his eyes not to address her but to accidentally (?) spit in her face. 
In a variation from the Pāli Jataka tale on which the Kavsilumi a is based, 
Kusa receives a gem necklace from the God Śakra after which he is possessed with a 
“lions roar,” powerful enough to paralyze the armies advancing to King Madra’s gates 
with fear, and to bring the opposing kings to his feet, cowering in submission.
115  
Kusa’s conquest makes “the dancers of joy and delight dance on the dance floor of 
[Pabhāvati’s] mind.”
116 In the original Pāli story, the gem is presented to Kusa only 
after the battle has been won, and seems to be intended solely as a remedy for his 
physical appearance.
117  
                                                 
115 Elsewhere in the Jatakas Sakka’s jewel is described as being passed down from a lineage of worthy 
kings. 
116 Ariyapala (2004), 735 (p.122) 
117 As, after donning the gem he and Pabhāvati are described as “alike” and “fair,” as “neither outshone 
the other.” (Jātaka, 312 (p.164))  
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The jewel, which dangling around Kusa’s neck recalls the Viśuddha cakra of 
Yogic symbolism so intimately connected with the power of voice, here endows Kusa 
with the power to humble his enemies with his voice alone, again recalling the 
intimacy of oratory power and statecraft.
118  Indeed we make take the variation in the 
Kusa story from its Pāli original as a recasting of the significance of the jewel boon in 
light of the personage of the cakravartin which emerged in medieval Sinhala 
literature: a ruler privy to knowledge of the essentials of aesthetics and statecraft, 
equipped with sufficient force of character to put such knowledge to use.  The 
Kavsilumi a goes on to introduce a new thematic element into the equation: Kusa is 
clearly possessed with a thorough knowledge of the essentials of the visual arts – he is 
clearly a rasika.  
 
The aesthetics of statecraft The aesthetics of statecraft The aesthetics of statecraft The aesthetics of statecraft      
One gets the sense that the cakravartin as we encounter him in the medieval 
Sinhala literary milieu is a deserving and rightful heir to power, but that the 
galvanizing power of language he possesses is in some sense transferable – it is passed 
down from learned men of old or bestowed as a boon from a divine source, a boon 
which can be imparted time and again (thus the symbolism of the jewel).  Indeed, the 
actual royal regalia inherited from one Sinhala Buddhist king to the next was thought 
to possess magical powers.  Described in the Culava sa are the king’s garb captured 
by the Cō as when they had overtaken the last king of Anuradhapura.  They were “the 
diadem that had been inherited, the priceless diamond that had been inherited, the 
                                                 
118 It is interesting to note that the Kavsilumi a’s  rendering, so interpreted, restores the jewel boon its 
purpose in the Mahāsudassana Sutta, wherein the cakravartin (Cakkavatti) receives a “gem treasure” 
“which when raised aloft casts light and enables the fourfold army to “march out in the gloom and 
darkness of the night.”” (S. Tambiah, 12)  
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priceless diamond bracelet, which was believed to have been the gift of Gods, the 
unbreakable sword and a fragment of the belt of Buddha.”
119  
*  *  * 
Pollock (1998) argues that in the cases of many empires historically, whether 
real empirical power operated or not, the perception of such power was maintained 
with a “language of cosmopolitan character and transethnic attraction, transcending 
or arresting any ethnoidentity the ruling class themselves might possess.”
120  Sinhala, 
of course, was a “vernacular” and not a cosmopolitan language.  But the medieval 
Buddhist kings of Sri Lanka – those of real life and those of fictional representation – 
were in the same way Pollock suggests mediators between the local and the trans 
local, and links between the present (their present) and the distant past (the time of 
the Buddha).  The conflation of the king with the Buddha (more about which will be 
said in the following chapter) and the notion of an inherited or otherwise transferable 
license to rule and literary aptitude provided a connection (in the case of the fragment 
of the belt of the Buddha, a tangible one) to the Buddha himself.  That a Buddhist 
king of Sri Lanka in the 10
th – 15
th centuries should be said to have eloquent mastery 
of Sinhala, Tamil, Pāli and Sanskrit may be seen as in some ways functionally 
equivalent to the claim that the Buddha possessed eloquent mastery of every language 
of the known world.  Sri Lankan kings were after all presiding over dominions which 
included non Sinhala speakers.  To be truly a “universal monarch” was to have the 
capacity to communicate with and instruct all of one’s subjects.  It also required that 
one be attuned to trans local cultures: fluency in Pāli was the means to do this with 
respect to the Buddhist world of the region, while Sanskrit was the gateway to the 
                                                 
119 H.W. Tambia, 302; Geiger’s translation of the Culavamsa, XLIV, vv. 127 8 
120 Pollock (1998), 13  
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cosmopolitan (and Pollock (1998) would argue, secular) culture of broader South 
Asia.   
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Chapter 4: Elite and popular aesthetics and morality 
 
Aesthetics and morality in court life 
In Courtly Culture and Political Life in Early India, Daud Ali draws on 
historiographic and literary sources to reconstruct a general picture of social life in 
Indian royal courts from the Gupta period to the establishment of the Delhi 
Sultanate, from approximately 300 to 1200 CE.  Ali includes a discussion of intimate 
relationship between the cultivation of aesthetic taste and the refinement of moral 
character.   
Discussing the medieval Indian conception of associates of the court, Ali 
details the way in which individuals were regarded as being “ornamented” with 
physical traits such as anatomical perfection, gestural grace and bodily movement, as 
well as personality traits and aptitudes such as playful demeanor and eloquent speech, 
and also, importantly, moral traits such as “stainless conduct” and “truthful 
speech.”
121  It was then as if persons existed only as some diaphanous substratum, 
completed only through the augmentation of particular attributes.  (This being not 
unlike the long standing belief among aestheticians that poetry consisted of a “body” 
(kāvyaśarīra) which was to be furnished with linguistic ornaments (ala kāras)).   
The view may have been that such physical, affective and moral attributes were 
the compliments to other various innate or unalterable conditions of one’s life.  
Consider the following excerpt from a 13
th century Kannada inscription describing a 
minister whose “abundance of brilliant bounty ([was] an ornament) to fortune, 
[whose] stainless conduct ([was] an ornament) to youth, [and whose] widespread fame 
([was] an ornament) to age.”
122  Life circumstances (such as fortune, youth, and age) 
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122 Ibid, 178 9  
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enabling the cultivation of virtues are conditions beyond personal control.  These 
worldly attainments and moral attributes (material bounty, stainless conduct, and 
fame) were beyond the capacity of those whose life trajectory did not place them 
within the auspices of the court, a fact to which Ali is sensitive: 
 
beauty, like so many other virtues, was viewed not merely as a set of 
attributes (though it was this too), but a capacity, partly bestowed by 
birth, which was to be realized through individual agency.  It was 
deemed beyond the aspirations of common people, but, within the 
society of the good, it formed a ceaseless and life long vocation.
123 
 
Virtues were thus to be “acquired” by noble persons as “badges” of their station in 
life.
124   
The substance accident conception of ornamentation extended beyond the 
realm of the personal to encompass almost any “complete relationship of two 
elements of any kind which was thought to be proper and good.”  The jewels of the 
court were the best of the king’s retinue, kings and ministers were “ornaments” of 
their family or lineage, wells, tanks, palaces and gardens were decorations of the city, 
and cities were ornaments of the earth.
125  Thus, 
                                                 
123 Ibid, 143 
124 According to Ali, this was done at one level by taking into consideration one’s “character” 
(presumably one’s disposition which is separate from accidental virtues and unalterable), and selecting 
from a “list” of virtues which would best accord with one another to yield the most adequate gestalt 
personality. (p.179)  This is however a rather ponderous interpretation of the notion of “ethical 
‘refinement’” and it is hard to imagine how such an undertaking would be performed in real life.  
Perhaps, at least in the case of living noblemen and women, “ethical refinement” meant largely an 
adaptation to one’s expected role as a courtier, minister, etc., as different roles within the court had 
attendant lists of necessary qualities (often formally enumerated).  Ethical conduct would in this sense 
be “performative” in the way in which Ali suggests that public displays of emotion were within the 
court.  (See Ali, 185.) 
125 Ali, 177  
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The great chain of being which linked all the elements of the universe 
into a coherent set of relationships was thus typically represented in 
courtly sources as a vast ‘ornamental order’.  The king, particularly in 
his role as the worldly embodiment of a cosmic overlord, often 
formed the centre of these representations, his sovereignty itself 
conceived of as adhering to his person like a vast array of 
ornaments.
126 
 
Popular vs. elite aesthetics and morality 
According to Ali, medieval Indian courtly culture afforded noblemen and 
women a certain freedom from the standards of propriety of non nobles.  
Appreciation of erotic visual art, drama, dance and literature was an expected 
preoccupation for elites.
127  As indicated by such words descriptive of noble 
comportment as vilāsa, rama a, lalita and līlā, courtiers and kings were permitted 
freedom of “mirthful spontaneity” and “charming insouciance,”
128 the terms also 
carrying undertones of sexual permissiveness.   
Ali claims that nonchalance and spontaneity were actually requisites of social 
interaction within the court.  He argues that it was presupposed that nobles possessed 
an uncanny ability to generate emotions, or specifically what he calls “commonly held 
dispositional states,” and would do so in permitting social contexts as a means of 
playful communication with likewise enabled peers, all of whom were receptive to the 
outward (i.e., bodily) manifestations of the dispositional states and the severity or 
                                                 
126 Ibid. 
127 ‘Proficiency in viewing dramas and court narratives’ is mentioned as one of the sixty four arts of 
the urbane man or courtier according to the Kāmasūtra. (Ali, 189)  This implies that there is some 
degree of skill involved in aesthetic appreciation. 
128 Ali, 15  
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levity of the communicative context at hand.
129  This capacity (which Ali terms a 
“subjectivity”):  
 
allowed both a reposeful delectation of emotions and a strategic 
itinerancy which enabled men and women to negotiate more effectively 
the relations of alliance, loyalty and antagonism which structured the 
affiliations of their lives.
130 
 
              While the conjuring of emotional states to facilitate social intercourse may 
strike the modern reader as insincere and frivolous, this practice (along with blatant 
sexual liberality) was thought to embody “the highest form of self control and 
discipline,” for a “cultivated spontaneity or playfulness…operated well within the 
protocols of respectability and received expectations of bodily carriage” for the 
elite.
131 
Non nobles for whom (1) cultivation in the aesthetic manners of the court was 
unachievable, and (2) whose births and life trajectories did not permit the cultivation 
of moral perfection and worldly attainment, were both thought to be inept in the 
appreciation of art and expected to abide by a more restrictive moral code.  Returning 
to the context of medieval Sri Lankan literary culture, we find parallels in the putative 
suitability of erotic kāvya and temperate prose work for elites and non elites. 
*  *  * 
Parākramabāhu II, a great patron of Buddhist learning institutions, established 
a code of rules (the Dambade i Katikāvata) with the assistance of a senior monk 
                                                 
129 Ibid, 203 4 
130 Ibid, 206 
131 Ibid, 158  
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(Āra yaka Mēdha kara) in the 13
th century.
132  This codified manual included 
provisions governing proper subjects of academic instruction, enjoining that “despised 
arts like drama and poetry should not be taught to others or learned.”
133  This was on 
account of the percieved danger that the stimulative imagery would present a 
distraction for Buddhist monks whose soteriological progress depended on withdrawal 
from the sensual realm.  According to the Dambade i Katikāvata, monks should also 
not compose or recite verses (ślokas) for laypeople.
134  These admonitions were 
extended to laypeople in their primary source of religious instruction, ba apot .  The 
Saddharmaratnāvaliya for example advises readers to “give up such useless studies as 
poetry and drama.”
135  Motivating the prohibition was once again the association of 
poetry and drama with the highly sensual realm of court aesthetics.
136   
We have explored the reasons why non elites were not regarded as having the 
accumen to appreciate poetry, drama or other high art in medieval Indian society.  
Although in the medieval Sri Lankan context the prohibition against partaking in high 
art was religiously motivated (i.e., it was thought to be soteriologically deleterious to 
do so), our study thus far has found dichotomies in medieval Sinhala literary culture 
associating aesthetic aptitude, virtue, literacy and social status which reflect those of 
Ali’s portrayal of medieval India.  Recall the discussion of the satpuru a from the 
previous chapter.  Also, the Kavsilumina (see chapter 3), one of the three extant 
Sinhala mahākāvya poems, offers some confirmation of these parallelisms.  Though 
taking as its subject a former life of the Buddha, the poem was composed in a court 
                                                 
132 Ariyapala (1968 [1956]), 9 
133 g hasthayan a solō ādiya bända nokiya yutu; kāvya nā ādī garhita vidyā tamā nūgatayutu, anunut 
nūgänviya yutu.  Ariyapala (1968 [1956]), 278.   
134 Hallisey (2003), 712, n.90 
135 Ariyapala (1968 [1956]), 278 
136 There was a continuity of court culture from the post Gupta India to the medieval period of Sri 
Lanka.  Kings underwent a similar coronation ritual, had similarly structured administrative systems, 
and kept large harems.  See Ariyapala (1968 [1956]) and H.W. Tambiah (1963).  
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(putatively by a king, no less) and catered to the sensibilities of those versed in the 
norms of epic poetry (being replete with the obligatory var anas or descriptions of the 
royal city, seasons, battle, etc.) while eschewing many aspects of traditional 
“Buddhist” morality.  It affirms instead the “morality of the court”: relish of physical 
beauty, sexual permissiveness and the necessary victory of imperial might – all of this 
while eliding the details of the Pāli Jātaka on which the poem is based, wherein 
Pabhāvati is portrayed as an unfortunate obstacle to Kusa’s (the Buddha’s) 
renunciation, and Kusa’s ugliness serves as a reminder of the futility of romantic 
endeavor. 
The following section addresses the emergence of Buddhabhakti  and the 
devotional expectations for the lay audiences of ba apot.  Texts advancing bhakti as a 
soteriological strategy contain an ethic and an aesthetic oriented towards non elites, 
affirming the supremacy of the Buddha as “king” and requiring absolute submission to 
him. 
 
Bhakti and aesthetic attitudes towards the Buddha 
As was addressed briefly in chapter three, the ba apot tradition was 
temporally associated with (and itself propagated) the rise of a new religious 
sentiment among Sri Lankan Buddhists: devotionalism.  The notion of performing 
rapturous “loving service” to a divine being as a means to religious emancipation 
(bhakti mārga as a means to mok a) had a likely origin before the common era,
137 
coming to ferment in the “Bhakti movement” beginning in South India in the 8
th 
century CE.
138  Dhammapala speculates that bhakti religiousity, both in its Mahāyāna 
                                                 
137 Rob Reed (1977) argues that sectarian devotionalism dates at least to the 4
th century BCE, and that 
the notion of bhakti mārga, along with other elements of the Bhagavad Gīta, were reactionary to the 
growing Buddhist movement in India around the beginning of the common era. 
138 G. Obeyesekere, 463  
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Buddhist and Vai navite manifestations, gradually diffused from India to Sri Lanka in 
the latter part of the first millennium, having its influence accelerated with the Co a 
invasions of the island in the 9
th, 10
th, and 11
th centuries.
139 
Portions of the canonical Pāli scriptures were antagonistic to dogmatic theistic 
devotion, and explicitly discouraged reverence for the body of the Buddha himself. 
The Vakkali Sutta of the Sa yutta Nikāya recalls the story of a Vakkali, a fatally ill 
monk whose dying regret was that he was unable for some time to see and pay homage 
to the Buddha in person.  Having sent his attendants to request his visit, the Buddha 
rebukes Vakkali saying, “Why do you want to see this foul body?  One who sees the 
Dhamma sees me; one who sees me sees the Dhamma.”
140   
The ba apot tradition, along with other Sinhala and Sanskrit texts of the 
medieval period in Sri Lanka, encouraged acts of devotional offering, the generation 
of strong emotions toward the Buddha, while portraying the Buddha in exhalted 
physical form and as possessing a near god like status.  In many cases the texts sought 
to exact a transferral of devotional sentiment from Brahmanical “Hindu” deities to 
the Buddha himself by way of Buddhabhakti.  Indeed the Buddha undergoes 
something of an apotheosis in the Sri Lankan literary tradition.  Though the 
appellation “king of the Gods” is reserved for Śakra, the Buddha is presented as 
supreme over other deities and as receiving their reverence.  The Jināla kāra
141 
                                                 
139 See Dhammapala, 110 11 
140 Sa yutta Nikāya, III. 87.  Reverence for the physical body of the Buddha is however elsewhere in 
the canon recommended.  The Mahāparinibbāna Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya gives an account of the 
Buddha advising Ananda on what is to be done after his death.  He establishes that the body of a 
Tathāgata is to be treated like that of a universal monarch – it should be given special funerary 
procedures, cremated and its remains enshrined in a stupa.  The Buddha claims that those who offer 
“garlands or incense or sandalpaste,” or who pay reverence to the stupa will experience well being and 
happiness for a long time.  (T.W. and C.A.F. Rhys Davids (2000 [1910]) vol. II, 155 6; Dīgha Nikāya, ii. 
142)  
141 A Sanskrit Sri Lankan Buddhist text dated by James Gray to the 4
th or 5
th century BCE. 
(Malalasekera, 18) Malalasekera claims that there is no historical evidence to confirm such great 
antiquity. (Ibid)  The Anuruddhaśataka, the other surviving Sri Lankan Buddhist Sanskrit text 
espousing such devotionalism, dates to approximately the 11
th century CE.  
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describes the Buddha as able to “walk inside a mustard seed and over shadow the 
universe by his own figure,”
142 promising that,  
 
One who is attached to the glorification of the Buddha and to his memory, 
with beliefs in his Buddhahood, may overcome all sins and attain 
Nibbāna.
143   
 
The Sasa Da Vata envisions the subjugation of a number of important figures of the 
Indian pantheon:  
 
Maha Brahma capable of illuminating 
The entire world, just by raising a finger, 
When in the presence of the Buddha 
Was like a firefly before the Sun. 
 
As Vishnu and Kuvera bowing down in worship 
Before the Buddha were engulfed in the effulgence 
Of rays emanating from [his] toe nails 
Their wives looked at them in bewilderment.
144 
 
In a passage suggesting that there was some contest between Buddhist and 
Brahmanical systems in Sri Lanka at the time, the Saddharmaratnāvaliya calls for 
strict devotion to the tisara a, the “three refuges” of the Buddha, Dhamma and 
Sangha: 
                                                 
142 Dhammapala, 115 
143 Ibid, 116 
144 vv.180, 181  
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Without bhakti towards [Hindu] gods such as Vi  u Maheśvara but having 
bhakti only in the three refuges, virtuous people should engage themselves 
in virtuous activities in order to realize nirvā a.
145 
 
              It warrants notice that the devotionalism embodied in these sources calls for 
absolute deference and submission.  Vi  u and Kuvera are portrayed as unworthy of 
even the feet (traditionally the most inauspicious part of the body) of the Buddha as 
they were “engulfed in the effulgence of rays emanating from [his] toe nails.” 
              The Sinhala Thūpava sa encourages ritualized worship of the Buddha and his 
relics principally by way of offerings (pūjā).  Berkwitz explains the tacit reasoning 
behind the act: “venerating the Buddha is depicted as being highly efficacious since it 
confirms one’s dependency on him and entitles one to merit and the enjoyment of 
felicities in the future.”
146  Devotional attitude and the merit derived from devotional 
acts were seen as both soteriologically necessary and sufficient.  According to the 
Saddharmaratnāvaliya,  
 
Just as ants are unable to pierce a mountain of diamond, and “stream 
winners” are unable to engage in akuśala which leads to hell, and the blind 
man is unable to go without his staff, so it is not possible for ordinary people 
of lesser intellect to understand the characteristics of existence (lak a a) 
through the medium of these characteristics, without having done any 
merit.
147 
 
                                                 
145 Deegalle (2006), 65 
146 Berkwitz (2004), 286 
147 Saddharmaratnāvaliya, 1:2; Hallisey (1988), 197  
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Devotion thus ensured the possibility of receptivity to the salvific force of the 
Buddha’s teaching (i.e., the “characteristics of existence”).  Small acts of generosity  
were thought to produce great soteriological and material benefits themselves.  
Butsara a assures the reader that poor women who had made small donations of 
food, cloth or flowers even on only one occasion to the Venerable One were assured 
the “prosperity of heaven and the good fortune of Nirvā a.”
148 
  The portrayal of devotion as at times necessary and at times sufficient for 
emancipation reveals tension in the ba apot tradition involving the amount of 
exertion and expenditure – both in physical/material terms and by way of abstract 
reasoning – required on behalf of the devotee to exact their own emancipation.  The 
contrast of passages such as that mentioned above from Butsara a with those such as 
the one given above from the Saddharmaratnāvaliya and with stories such as that of 
the demoness Kālī (the recapitulation of the Jātaka story discussed by Hallisey and 
Hansen (see chapter 2) in the Saddharmaratnāvaliya) call into question (respectively) 
the amount of understanding of abstract doctrine and moral reflection required for 
individual emancipation.  In the case of Butsara a, Nirvā a seems to be the outcome 
of a rather mechanical, syllogistic process: ‘Give and thou shalt receive.’  Stories such 
as that of the demoness Kālī and others seem to promote intense moral reflection 
while affirming the importance of life experience for soteriolgical progress.   
The story of Kā ā given in the Saddharmaratnāvaliya illustrates the close 
relationship between acts of devotional generosity and material and soteriological 
fruits.  Kā ā, travelling home to her husband from her Mother’s house stops to offer 
the honey cakes she has brought (to give to her husband) to different monks whom 
she passes on four separate occasions.  Her arrival is consequently delayed to such an 
extent that her husband takes another wife in the meantime.  Blaming the monks for 
                                                 
148 Butsara a, §9  
  54 
her loss, Kā ā not only ceases her customary almsgiving but abuses any monk she sees 
to the point that they are afraid to approach her street altogether.  The Buddha hears 
of this and meets Kā ā at her mother’s home, subsequently prompting her to realize 
that the monks have not wronged her, and that she is not justified in so treating them.  
The Buddha then delivers a sermon to her, thus setting her on the Path as a sōvān (a 
Sotāpanna or “stream enterer”), “having called forth devotion in her.”
149  The king of 
the land learns of the story and, seeing that though Kā ā’s mind “was now adorned 
with the ornaments of a sōvān her body was unadorned,” grants her the rank of 
“eldest daughter,” declaring to the Buddha, 
 
Your Reverence, you have given her the otherworldly blessings of 
Spiritual Attainments [lovuturā säpatin], but I will give this person who is 
depressed because she has lost her material benefits, the blessings of the 
world too.
150 
 
The king grants Kā ā a palace with four entrances from which she can “invite in any 
monk or nun who happened to pass” in order to offer alms of their daily needs, or to 
give them an opportunity to preach.  The story ends with a parable and injunction: 
 
Just as the moon is first glimpsed with difficulty and after much effort, so 
engage [tirelessly] in Acts of Merit, acquire material weath, and finally 
attain nirvā a.
151 
 
                                                 
149 “sädäe [i.e., śraddhā] äti karavā” (Saddharmaratnāvaliya, 546) 
150 R. Obeyesekere (2001), 115; Saddharmaratnāvaliya, 545 
151 Ibid, 116  
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              The story affirms the importance of alsmgiving and devotion without eliding 
the role of ethical reflection in soteriological progress.  (Before the Buddha delivers 
his sermon to  her, Kā ā must acknowledge that the monks to whom she gave the oil 
cakes had not taken what was not given.)  While this ethical reflection plays a decisive 
narrative role, the entire story revolves around Kā ā’s generosity and devotion: she 
loses her appreciation for the Sangha and perforce the Buddha’s teaching when she  
abandons almsgiving.  Her devotion is greatly intensified and her generosity resumes 
many fold when her faith is restored (quite single handedly) by the Buddha himself.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusions Chapter 5: Conclusions Chapter 5: Conclusions Chapter 5: Conclusions      
 
The early Pāli Buddhist literary tradition contains thematic elements which 
seem to both presuppose and deny emotional realism.  The prospect of a tacit “moral 
naturalism” in the Pāli Jātakas and other canonical literature (see the discussion of 
Heim (2003) in chapter two) concords with emotional realism in extending the 
uniformity of response to certain actions from the natural world to the human 
emotional world.  If, however, we are to read these narratives as expressing a 
prescriptive rather than descriptive attitude towards human emotions, this would 
seemingly evince the exact opposite conclusion: it would appear that the texts 
intended to condition readers to respond a certain way to certain actions, rather then 
presupposing that they would (i.e., before readers had encountered such narratives).   
While the question of the significance of “moral naturalism” vis a vis 
emotional realism remains ambiguous, the repeated mention of the Buddha’s 
sensitivity to the receptive capacities (i.e., their aptitudes for receiving instruction in 
abstract concepts, and their varying likely responses to given narrative events) appears 
prima facie to suggest against emotional realism (in that, if emotional responses to 
certain stimuli were uniform, this aspect of the Buddha’s teaching ability would not 
receive such highlight).  We should not be hasty in concluding however that the 
recognition of varying levels of aesthetic receptivity is incommensurable with the 
possibility of a normative, “optimal” receptivity of the sort.  The thought could be that 
while some are predisposed to comprehending the Dhamma through an assortment of 
didactic methods – from the direct to the allegorical – others lack such receptivity (in 
part, aesthetic/emotional receptivity), on account of both learning in one’s lifetime 
and, perhaps, one’s innate condition (the result of karma?).  This would not discount 
the possibility of an ideal of emotional receptivity, supposing that optimally (for the  
  57 
sake of comprehension of the Dhamma) we should each respond the same way to 
certain stimuli.  The supposition in the canonical literature that there is a correct way 
of “seasoning” or “ornamenting” abstract doctrine to make them more palatable to 
the average person confirms to some degree a normative understanding of aesthetic 
responsiveness.  (Recall from chapter two that it is claimed that the “True Law” 
(saddhamma) will be preserved when a monk is “in full possession” of a discourse, 
“with well put verses and flavorings (sunikkhittehi pada vyañjanehi): for, [Oh monks], 
if verses and their flavorings are well put, the practical meaning is likewise easy to 
follow.”
152)  
The literary traditions of medieval India and Sri Lanka evidence more 
conspicuously defined presuppositions regarding the innateness of aesthetic 
receptivity.  Concordant in many respects with the attitudes of Gupta and post Gupta 
continental court culture, medieval Sinhala Buddhist literature concatenates aesthetic 
sensitivity (both in appreciation and artistic production), moral authority, and the 
ability to politically govern as traits of ruling class persons.  Elites – kings, associates of 
the court, the satpuru as – were distinguished from the illiterate and less cosmpolitan 
by the types of literary works directed to each, and by the expectations described of 
them in those works.  Elites were presented as possessing both freedom from the 
strictures of lay morality and also immense responsibility for preserving the well being 
of their polity.  The expectation of the “average” man or woman was, generally 
speaking in the medieval Sinhala Buddhist context, devotion through pious 
veneration.  Devotion was presented as soteriologically necessary and sufficient: one 
could not appreciate the meaning of the Buddha’s teaching without a devotional 
attitude, and small acts of devotion and generosity were sufficient for soteriological 
fruits.  The ethics of bhakti literature thus appear quite simple: accepting the Buddha 
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as the moral person par excellence and possessing gratitude for his long ago 
dispensation makes one a moral person. 
 While this attitude may appear to represent a contraction in the sphere of 
subjective freedom of thought from early Pāli Buddhist (and Indian Sanskrit) 
literature, (wherein moral points are ascertained only after reflection on narratives in 
their gestalt), as the stories of the demoness Kālī and Kā ā reveal, the ba apot 
tradition affirms the importance of moral reflection for the soteriological progress of 
the characters of the story, and thus for the reader herself.  The story of Kā ā 
illustrates within a single narrative the importance of both devotional acts (in this 
case, that of pious generosity) and of moral reflection (realizing that the monks had 
not taken what was not given) in the acquisition of soteriological fruits (Kā ā’s 
entrance to the Path of the sōvān). 
While this example is complex in its implications for the ethical matrix of 
ba apot tradition, we cannot ignore the quite straightforward statements in texts such 
as Butsara a which seem to advance a syllogistic formula for the attainment of 
Nirvā a.  The repeated affirmation of the soteriological efficacy of mere devotional 
sentiment and action is one indication that literature promoting Buddhabhakti  
intends to emotionally condition the reader or hearer of the text (as Berkwitz argues 
to be the case with historiographical literature affirming dependence on the Buddha 
for present felicities and soteriological opportunities).  In the case of this bhakti 
literature, “loving devotion” is to be evoked in the presence of the Buddha, either as 
literary character, icon or as some other representation.   
Such blunt affirmation of a single figure’s moral superiority (and its attendant 
“emotional conditioning”) may have served a practical purpose beyond the realm of 
the soteriological.  The depiction of the Buddha as a moral exemplar and sovereign 
has structural parallels with affirmations of political allegiance.  The ritual  
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manifestations of bhakti such as pūja, veneration of iconography of the Buddha (and 
his other physical representations – stūpas, bodhi trees, relics, etc.), and verse 
recitation are reminiscent of a pledge of allegiance to a nation or political figure.  The 
homage of the Hindu deities to the Buddha in Sasa Da Vata (which is performed as 
the Buddha is seated on a throne, guarded by the four Vedic Lokapalas) carries 
obvious symbolic weight.  There are also strong monarchical associations involved in 
the notion of pūjā as Berkwitz presents it – here offerings are akin to tithe paid 
affirming dependence on the king as one ‘confirms dependence on the Buddha.’ 
Indeed, we have seen the Buddha conflated with the king in incipient and 
occasional references in the earliest Pāli scriptures with the imagery becoming more 
pronounced and sophisticated in later Sri Lankan literature of both local (Sinhala) 
and trans local/cosmopolitan (Sanskrit) languages, and in both the “devotional” and 
metropolitan literature (literatures composed for both popular and educated/court 
associated audiences).  This conflation involves the legitimation of authority on two 
levels: 
 
1.  That of actual living kings, legitimating themselves through a variety of means.  In 
the Pāli and Sinhala va sas the right to rule of kings was presented as having been 
ordained in the distant past.  Other sources associate king’s capacities for governance 
with those of the Buddha. 
 
2.  The legitimation of the Buddha himself (i.e., over figures representing competing 
theistic systems).  The Buddha as teacher and orator par excellence validated him
153 as 
                                                 
153 Or perhaps rather, his instruction (the Dhamma), since the Buddha was believed to have passed out 
of the world.  
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the governor of all men.  (Indeed the Buddha as ‘tamer of men’ was an important 
theme of much medieval Sinhala literature, most notably the Amāvatura.) 
 
Historically the legitimation of the king and Buddha may have gone hand in 
hand in a real struggle for political dominion in Sri Lanka.  Hallisey (1988) explores 
the confluence of causes which motivated what he calls attempts at “vertical 
integration” of Buddhist society by the ruling class.   
Prior to the 9
th century, Buddhist literature in India and Sri Lanka was directed 
to its audience “horizontally” – it was composed by Buddhist monks for other 
Buddhist monks in a lingua franca (Pāli) shared (perhaps nearly exclusively) by their 
community.  Though there are scattered references to exhortations for lay behavior in 
the Buddhist literature of this period, they are scant.  The dichotomous relationship of 
regent and subject which figures so prominently in the Sri Lankan medieval period 
was also not to be found. 
An increasingly feudal medieval India brought efforts by rulers, allied with 
religious institutions, towards the “vertical” social integration of their polities.  
“Imperial cults” were established in the 8
th century with a Hindu deity being either 
conflated with the king or perceived as in some way licensing his reign.
154  Clergy thus 
were drawn into the sphere of political concern as legitimators of the ruling elite, 
encouraged to make the religious ideology of the “cult” accessible to subjects of the 
polity (i.e., “downwards” on the vertical scale of social hierarchy).  The influence of 
this new strategy of political governance as well as an influx of competing religious 
systems invited efforts of similar “vertical integration” by medieval Sri Lankan rulers.   
In addition to influence from the political climate of medieval India, the 
contraction of Buddhist influence on the sub continent and invasions and raids by 
                                                 
154 See Hallisey (1988), 187  
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“Hindu” peoples from South India contributed to a perceived need for self 
preservation among Sinhala Buddhists.  The Pā  ya, Pallava and Cō a dynasties came 
to power at various times in various locations in South India in the 5th and 6th 
centuries, each intent on eliminating Buddhist influence in the region.  Their efforts, 
augmented by the Persian invasions of the late first millennium precipitated the 
collapse of Buddhist centers of learning on the sub continent, meaning that “one 
supremely important religio cultural link between South India and the Sinhalese 
kingdom was severed.”
155  De Silva speculates that during this period, Tamils in Sri 
Lanka became increasingly self aware of their own ethnic, cultural and religious 
identities, and thus became sources of support for South Indian (Tamil) invaders.
156  
Sri Lanka was increasingly exposed to “Hindu” theistic systems (both 
Vai  avism and particularly Śaivism) largely as a consequence of the Cō a invasions of 
the 9
th – 11
th centuries (the Cō as having secured rule of the northern portion of the 
island through the 10
th and 11
th centuries).  With greater religious pluralism came 
greater exclusivity within the Sinhala Buddhist community.  Buddhist monastics who 
depended upon lay patronage were forced to compete for resources with Śaivite 
monastics – these religious groups having been instrumental in effecting vertical social 
integration in medieval India.
157   
Following the expulsion of the Cō as in 1070, Sinhala Buddhist kings  
attempted to restore the island wide centralized authority which had been sustained 
for the millennium prior to the 9
th century (the “Anurādhapura period”).  These 
efforts, most successfully attempted by Vijayabāhu I (1055 1110), Parākramabāhu I 
(1153 86), and Niśśa ka Malla (1187 96), involved the establishment of a more 
centralized bureaucracy than was in place during the Anurādhapura period, which had 
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permitted a substantial amount of sovereignty to local fiefdoms.
158  As in medieval 
India, the consolidation of political power in Sri Lanka was facilitated by the 
identification of the king with a figure already representing authority (albeit religious, 
not political authority), immanent in the minds of the populous.
159   
There was then an incentive both for rulers and monastics to elevate the figure 
of the Buddha above competing religious icons.  For kings this elevation was a means 
of legitimation of their rule for the reasons described above, and for monastics it 
meant greater security of material provisions.  While formerly the reading and 
discussion of liturgy had been under the providence of monastics (and, as early va sa 
references to preacher kings indicate, also royalty), Buddhist literature for the first 
significant time was now addressed to lay people outside of the ruling class.  Hallisey 
contends that, “Vertical integration of the Buddhist community in medieval Sri Lanka 
was in fact an attempt to make an elite religion “popular.””
160 
Importantly, the means of legitimation to rule were presented as the same for 
both kings and the Buddha.  Their moral authority is perpetually presented 
contiguously to their aptitude for aesthetic production.  Participating in an extension 
of the same courtly and literary world as post Gupta period India, medieval Sri Lanka 
seems to be interpretable with Ali’s paradigm regarding the association of these 
themes. 
  Pollock (1998) argues that knowledge of a trans local language was symbolic of 
(though perhaps not actually effective in) license to rule over a diverse (and therefore 
expansive) populous.
161  In portraying the Buddha as knowing all the languages of all 
                                                 
158 See De Silva, 60 3 
159 For a detailed study of the identification of medieval Sri Lankan kings with the Buddha, see Holt 
(1991). 
160 Hallisey (1988), 201 
161 A cosmopolitan language had to be one “capable of making translocal claims – however imaginary 
these were – that defined the political imagination of the world.” Pollock (1998), 13  
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the creatures of the world, Butsara a makes the Buddha in a sense the embodiment of 
cosmopolitanism.  As the fit South Asian king was to be versed in Sanskrit (and, in Sri 
Lanka, traditionally five other languages as well), so the Buddha as Lord of the World 
was to be knowledgeable of the language of each creature within his dominion.  The 
image of the Buddha as cosmopolitan king then works to integrate both horizontally 
and vertically: possessing moral authority and the knowledge of the means to 
emancipation he is positioned to rule over the less knowledgeable, and knowing how 
to communicate with a vast array of beings, his license to rule extends “horizontally” 
over all the potential subjects of the world. 
Given this context, we might envision that the affirmation of the aesthetic, 
moral and linguistic capacities of the elite (of which there are numerous contiguous 
references in the Sinhala literature and which, according to Ali, went hand in hand in 
medieval India) was a means of self affirming political authority and license to govern.  
The transferability, albeit exclusive transferability, of the empowering command of 
language was symbolized in the royal regalia adorning the fictional kings of poetry and 
those real kings of Sri Lankan history.  The impossibility of obtaining such aesthetic 
aptitude and of cultivating the “subjectivity” afforded to court associates precluded 
the engagement of non elites with the power structure of the court and, a fortiori, 
their ability to be political rulers themselves.  
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